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The Fix Was In: Mitre’s ‘Independent’ Review of Free File
by Dennis J. Ventry Jr.
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Introduction
Last year, a firestorm engulfed the IRS Free 
File program. Investigative news reports revealed 
that members of the Free File Alliance (FFA) — the 
consortium of tax return preparation software 
firms partnering with the IRS to offer free return 
filing to 70 percent of taxpayers — were actively 
undermining Free File participation. Such 
behavior violated provisions of the memorandum 
of understanding between the IRS and the FFA,1 
an agreement into which the parties entered 
“intending to be legally bound.”2 It also 
potentially constituted unfair and deceptive trade 
practices and unfair methods of competition 
under federal and state law.3 Highlights of the 
violative behavior included:
• Intuit — the maker of TurboTax, a founding 
member of the FFA, and the return 
preparation firm with the industry’s largest 
market share4 — used deceptive web design 
and misleading advertising known as “dark 
patterns” to trick low-income taxpayers into 
paying to file their taxes, even though they 
were eligible to file for free with Free File.5
• Intuit and H&R Block deliberately hid their 
Free File offers from eligible Free File users 
by adding code to their Free File websites, 
which had the effect of preventing those 
Dennis J. Ventry Jr. is 
a professor at UC Davis 
School of Law and a 
former chair of the IRS 
Advisory Council.
In this report, Ventry 
analyzes Mitre Corp.’s 
review of the IRS Free 
File program. He 
argues that Mitre’s lack 
of professional distance 
from the IRS prevented 
it from delivering an 
independent report. He 
discusses how Mitre found a majority of Free 
File Alliance (FFA) companies hid their Free 
File websites from eligible Free File users, and 
lured them to commercial sites. He shows how 
Mitre reinforced the view that FFA companies 
participate in Free File for economic gain rather 
than “philanthropy,” and warned the IRS 
against challenging the “free-to-fee” model. 
Mitreʹs warning was unnecessary, Ventry 
concludes, because the IRS is complicit in the 
FFAʹs actions.
1
See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text for specific examples of 
how FFA companies violated the MOU.
2
Eighth Memorandum of Understanding on Service Standards and 
Disputes Between the Internal Revenue Service and Free File Inc., at 
preamble (Oct. 31, 2018).
3
See infra notes 11-22 and 185-196 and accompanying text.
4
See Michael Cohn, “Tax Reform Had Little Impact on Tax Prep. 
Market Share, Says Moodys,” Accounting Today, Apr. 29, 2019 (showing 
Intuit with a 30 percent share of all e-filing and H&R Block with a 16 
percent share).
5
See Justin Elliott and Lucas Waldron, “Here’s How TurboTax Just 
Tricked You Into Paying to File Your Taxes,” ProPublica, Apr. 22, 2019.
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websites from appearing in online search 
results.6
• A subsequent study conducted by 
congressional staffers found that three 
additional FFA companies — TaxSlayer, 
FreeTaxUSA, and 1040.com — engaged in 
the same obstructive behavior.7
• Intuit and H&R Block deliberately and 
tactically steered low-income taxpayers 
from free products (including Free File) to 
paid products.8
• In defending his company hiding its Free 
File product from eligible Free File users, 
Intuit’s CEO said it was merely acting “in the 
best interest of taxpayers” by steering them 
to “educational content” rather than to 
Intuit’s Free File offer.9
• Intuit promoted a “military discount” under 
its commercial version of TurboTax and then 
charged service members for return prep 
services, even though they would have 
otherwise been eligible to file for free under 
Intuit’s Free File product.10
In response to these and other revelations, 
prominent members of Congress asked the 
Federal Trade Commission to investigate whether 
Intuit, H&R Block, and other FFA companies’ 
behavior constituted “unfair and deceptive 
practices or unfair methods of competition, and to 
determine if these companies may have entered 
into an illegal agreement to do so.”11
The Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration opened its own examination of 
the Free File program.12 Treasury Inspector 
General J. Russell George told Congress in 
September that TIGTA’s audit of the IRS’s 
administration of Free File was motivated by 
concerns that “taxpayers eligible for the program 
were being charged for returns or being diverted 
to preparation services that are not free.”13
States, cities, and counties also undertook 
investigations of the Free File program and the 
business practices of FFA companies, some in the 
form of litigation. At the behest of New York Gov. 
Andrew Cuomo (D), the New York State 
Department of Financial Services initiated an 
inquiry into four FFA companies, including Intuit 
and H&R Block, over possible violations of the 
state’s unfair and deceptive trade practices law.14 
In addition, the Los Angeles city attorney filed 
separate suits against Intuit and H&R Block 
alleging the companies violated California’s 
Unfair Competition Law.15 As alleged, Intuit and 
H&R Block “defrauded the lowest earning 70 
percent of American taxpayers . . . by actively 
undermining public access to the IRS’s ‘Free File’ 
program, while simultaneously employing 
deceptive and misleading advertising and design 
schemes intended to induce taxpayers into 
unnecessarily purchasing expensive products.”16 
Santa Clara County filed its own suit against 
Intuit under California’s false and deceptive 
advertising law alleging that Intuit made “false or 
misleading statements about TurboTax and 
taxpayers’ ability to file their taxes for free, by 
causing such statements to be made and 
disseminated to the public, and by making 
statements that taxpayers could use TurboTax for 
free with the intent to charge most of those 
taxpayers to use TurboTax and/or to sell a 
different service than advertised.”17
Lawsuits brought by individual California 
residents (some purporting to represent a class of 
similarly situated Californians) were also filed 
6
See Elliott, “TurboTax Deliberately Hid Its Free File Page From 
Search Engines,” ProPublica, Apr. 26, 2019.
7
Letter to Federal Trade Commission from Elizabeth Warren et al. 
(May 2, 2019) (describing congressional staff study, which found five 
FFA companies hid Free File sites from searches).
8
See Elliott and Paul Kiel, “TurboTax and H&R Block Saw Free Tax 
Filing as a Threat — and Gutted It,” ProPublica, May 2, 2019.
9
Elliott and Waldron, “Intuit CEO in Internal Video: Hiding Free 
TurboTax Was in ‘Best Interest of Taxpayers,’” ProPublica, May 15, 2019.
10
Elliott and Kengo Tsutsumi, “TurboTax Uses a ‘Military Discount’ 
to Trick Troops Into Paying to File Their Taxes,” ProPublica, May 23, 2019.
11
Letter to FTC, supra note 7.
12
Elliott, “Senior IRS Leaders Launch Review of Agency’s 
Partnership With TurboTax and H&R Block,” ProPublica, May 6, 2019 
(reporting TIGTA as “launching an audit of the Free File program”).
13
Testimony of George before the House Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government, at 7-8 
(Sept. 24, 2019).
14
Paige Jones, “New York Investigates Companies Over Free File 
Allegations,” Tax Notes Federal, May 20, 2019, p. 1250.
15
See People of the State of California v. Intuit Inc., No. 19STCV15644 
(Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, May 6, 2019); and People of the State of 
California v. H&R Block Inc., No. 19STCV15752 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. 
County, May 6, 2019). For California’s unfair competition law, see Cal. 
Bus. & Prof. Code section 17200 et seq.
16
Intuit, No. 19-cv-354178, at 1; and H&R Block, No. 19STCV15752, at 
1.
17
Intuit, No. 19-cv-354178, at 22-23.
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against Intuit. These suits alleged violations of 
California’s unfair competition law,18 Consumers 
Legal Remedies Act,19 false advertising law,20 and 
general claims of fraud and unjust enrichment. 
Some of these suits have been consolidated into a 
large putative class action that is proceeding in 
federal court in the Northern District of 
California.21 Others have been dismissed, stayed, 
or are pending.22
Meanwhile, the Free File controversy 
threatened to derail the Taxpayer First Act of 2019 
(TFA),23 a bipartisan, bicameral tax administration 
bill that was two years in the making and passed 
the House in early April 2019.24 The TFA 
contained a provision that would have codified 
the IRS Free File program and made it a 
permanent part of the IRC.25 Critics of the 
provision worried that codification would 
prevent the IRS from walking away from the Free 
File partnership or developing its own in-house, 
free e-filing program,26 an option that the agency 
had enjoyed since the program’s inception in 
2002.27 Meanwhile, supporters of the TFA (even if 
not supporters of Free File) insisted that the bill 
did not prohibit the IRS from developing 
alternatives to Free File.28 To avert having the 
standoff scuttle the bill altogether,29 legislators 
stripped out the offending Free File provision,30 
preserved the other 45 provisions, and passed a 
restyled TFA31 in late June.32 On July 1 the 
president signed the bill into law.33
Amidst the backlash to FFA companies’ 
potentially illegal behavior and doubtful 
commitment to the success of the Free File 
program, the IRS defended its private sector 
partners. “Free File has been a successful program 
and partnership that’s benefited millions of 
taxpayers,” the agency said, even after reports 
surfaced that FFA companies deliberately hid 
their Free File sites from eligible Free File 
taxpayers searching for Free File products.34
But even the IRS could not ignore the parade 
of horribles. In early May the agency announced it 
was assembling a “senior leadership team . . . to 
review the current Free File program” and would 
“take fast action to ensure the integrity of the 
program.”35 Weeks later, IRS Commissioner 
Charles Rettig reiterated the agency’s 
commitment to “taking a hard look at every facet” 
of the program as a way to assure taxpayers that 
Free File has “unparalleled integrity.”36 An 
“independent consultant” would be selected to 
conduct an “independent review,” and to leave no 
stone unturned while bringing a critical eye to the 
program.37 Observers were heartened by the 
announcement, including key members of 
Congress who pressed the IRS to seek a full and 
complete investigation of Free File and FFA 
18
Intuit, No. 19-cv-354178; H&R Block, No. 19STCV15752. For 
California’s unfair competition law, see Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code section 
17200 et seq.
19
See Cal. Civ. Code section 1750 et seq.
20
See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code section 17500 et seq.
21
See Consolidated Class Action Complaint, Demand for Jury Trial, 
In re Intuit Free File Litigation, No. 3-19-cv-02546 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
22
See, e.g., Macklin v. Intuit Inc., No. 19-cv-347208 (Cal. Super. Ct., 
Santa Clara County, 2019) (stayed); and Callaway v. Intuit Inc., No. 19-cv-
354484 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara County 2019) (dismissed without 
prejudice).
23
H.R. 1957, Taxpayer First Act of 2019 (TFA 2019).
24
Stephen K. Cooper and Fred Stokeld, “House Approves IRS 
Reform Measure Despite Free File Fight,” Tax Notes, Apr. 15, 2019, p. 471.
25
See TFA 2019, supra note 23, at section 1102, “IRS Free File 
Program.”
26
See, e.g., Cooper and Stokeld, supra note 24 (quoting Rep. 
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, D-N.Y.); Rep. Sean Casten, D-Ill., press 
release, “Casten Statement: Fighting for Free Tax Filing Services” (Apr. 
10, 2019); and Jeff Stein and Rachael Bade, “House Backs Bill Barring IRS 
From Offering Free Tax Filing Services,” The Washington Post, Apr. 9, 
2019 (quoting former Rep. Katie Hill and Rep. Ro Khanna, D-Calif.).
27
Since 2002 the Free File program has operated under an original 
agreement (“Free Online Electronic Tax Filing Agreement” (Oct. 30, 
2002), 67 F.R. 67247 (Nov. 4, 2002)) as amended by five subsequent 
agreements and eight MOUs, all of which included termination clauses 
permitting the IRS to terminate with or without cause. See 67 F.R. at 
67251; and Eighth MOU, supra note 2, at arts. 10.1 to 10.3.
28
See, e.g., Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., “Making It Easier to File Taxes,” 
The New York Times, Apr. 14, 2019; and Cooper and Stokeld, supra note 24, 
at 471-472 (quoting Senate Finance Committee Chair Chuck Grassley, R-
Iowa).
29
See Jad Chamseddine, “Free File Allegations Freeze IRS Overhaul 
Bill” (May 15, 2019).
30
See Chamseddine, “Revised IRS Reform Bill Omits Free File 
Language,” Tax Notes, June 10, 2019, p. 1739.
31
Taxpayer First Act, P.L. 116-25 (July 1, 2019).
32
See Chamseddine, “Senate Clears IRS Reform Bill for Trump’s 
Signature,” Tax Notes Federal, June 17, 2019, p. 1886.
33
William Hoffman, “Tax Pros Find Much to Like as Taxpayer First 
Act Becomes Law,” Tax Notes Federal, July 8, 2019, p. 244.
34
Elliott, supra note 6.
35
IRS Statement on Free File (May 3, 2019).
36
Allyson Versprille, “IRS Hiring Consultant After Uproar Over Free 
File,” Bloomberg Tax, May 22, 2019.
37
Jonathan Curry, “IRS Bringing in Fresh Eyes to Review Free File,” 
Tax Notes, May 27, 2019, p. 1422.
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companies “to ensure industry compliance” with 
the MOU and to further “ensure the integrity and 
purpose of the Free File program.”38 It seemed that 
Free File and the IRS’s private sector partners 
would finally receive the kind of rigorous, 
independent review39 that critics had been 
requesting for years.40
Two months later, however, when the IRS 
announced the contractor that would conduct the 
“independent” review of the besieged Free File 
program, hope for a conflict-free review was lost.
The Fix Was In
In early July the IRS announced it had 
awarded a contract to Mitre Corp. “to conduct an 
independent third-party review of the Free File 
program,” at a potential cost of $3,178,138.41 Three 
months later, parts of Mitre’s report, 
“Independent Assessment of the Free File 
Program,”42 trickled into the public domain, albeit 
under odd circumstances.43 The FFA — whose 
members were the subject of the report — wasted 
no time in publicizing Mitre’s “extensive 
independent review” of the Free File program.44 
The IRS joined in, saying it hired Mitre “to 
conduct an independent review” of Free File and 
that it was “carefully reviewing” Mitre’s 
“independent assessment.”45
But much like FFA member Intuit’s promises 
to deliver “Free Federal. Free State. Free to File. 
FREE guaranteed. $0 $0 $0,”46 stating over and over 
again that something is true does not necessarily 
make it true.
The fact of the matter is that Mitre is anything 
but independent when it comes to the IRS. So it 
comes as no surprise that the report reads more 
like advocacy of the IRS-FFA partnership and a 
defense of FFA companies’ behavior than an 
independent, objective, rigorous examination of 
the IRS Free File program and the IRS’s private 
sector partners.
For starters, Mitre is a major and important 
IRS contractor. Since 1998 it has run what 
amounts to a national lab sponsored by Treasury 
and the IRS and cosponsored by the Department 
of Veterans Affairs, called the Center for 
Enterprise Modernization (CEM), a federally 
funded research and development center.47 In 
October 2018 Mitre signed a $650 million contract 
to continue running the CEM for another five-
year term.48
The CEM is focused on modernizing 
bureaucracies and updating IT systems 
infrastructure. But unlike other IRS contractors 
that are paid primarily for programming and 
reprogramming IRS computers (including 
Accenture, Booz Allen Hamilton, Deloitte, IBM, 
and Northrup Grumman), Mitre provides higher-
level advice and strategy.49 Indeed, Mitre is 
intimately involved with IRS management in 
myriad ways, from creating web apps to running 
the IRS information sharing and analysis center 
for identity theft and tax refund fraud to 
38
Finance Committee press release, “Grassley, Wyden Press IRS for 
Accountability Regarding the Free File Program” (May 7, 2019).
39
See, e.g., Versprille, supra note 36 (quoting Rettig saying the IRS 
would not shrink from examining “every facet” of the program).
40
See, e.g., statement of Nina Olson, former national taxpayer 
advocate, during hearing on the tax return filing season before House 
Ways and Means Subcommittee on Oversight, at 21-22 (Mar. 7, 2019) 
(testifying that Free File “is failing to achieve its objectives and should be 
substantially improved or eliminated”); and IRS Advisory Council 
public report, at 17 (Nov. 2018) (IRSAC 2018) (urging systemic and 
immediate improvements to the Free File program).
41
Naomi Jagoda, “IRS Announces Contractor Reviewing ‘Free File’ 
Program,” The Hill, July 12, 2019. For a summary of the contract, see 
USASpending.gov.
42
Mitre Corp., “Independent Assessment of the Free File Program, 
Free File Program Assessment Final Report” (Oct. 3, 2019) (final report).
43
Parts of the report entered the public domain on October 8, with no 
announcement from the IRS or Mitre. Some news organizations received 
the report, while others did not. With no publicity, the IRS posted to its 
“newsroom” website three documents associated with the Mitre report 
at 9 a.m. EST on October 8, while four additional documents posted the 
next day between 2 and 2:30 p.m. EST. See IRS Newsroom, IRS Static 
Files Directory (viewed Oct. 17, 2019). All seven documents were 
stamped on every page, “Pre-Decisional — For Internal IRS W&I Use 
Only — Not for Public Release.” On October 11 the IRS posted a 
“statement” with links to all seven documents. IRS, “IRS Statement on 
Free File Program” (Oct. 11, 2019). The FFA received the report in plenty 
of time to digest its 400-plus pages and issue a press release on October 
8. See FFA press release, “Independent Review Calls Benefits of Public-
Private Free Tax-Filing Partnership ‘Substantial,’ Allowing IRS to Avoid 
‘Prohibitive Costs,’” (Oct. 8, 2019).
44
FFA press release, supra note 43.
45
IRS statement, supra note 43.
46
See Intuit TurboTax blog (Dec. 27, 2019) (emphasis in original).
47
See CEM, “Where We Focus”; and CEM, “Tax, Revenue & Financial 
System Transformation.”
48
See Paul Merion, “Non-Profit Think Tank Plays Key Role IRS 
Decision-Making,” 15 MLex US Tax Watch 5 (Oct. 9, 2018).
49
See, e.g., Merion, “Nine Contractors Tapped to Update IRS 
Computer Systems,” 31 MLex US Tax Watch 4 (June 24, 2019); Merion, 
“Seven Data Firms Retained to Analyze Pressing IRS Issues,” 19 MLex 
US Tax Watch 5 (Dec. 18, 2018); Merion, “Largest IRS Contractors Driven 
by Agency’s Data Needs,” 11 MLex US Tax Watch 5 (July 27, 2018); and 
Merion, “IRS Outsources Bulk of New Tax Law’s Implementation,” 8 
MLex US Tax Watch 7 (June 8, 2018).
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developing predictive algorithms for catching tax 
evasion, to conducting R&D credit audits for the 
IRS.50
Mitre and the IRS enjoy a long, cozy, 
codependent relationship. Or, in the words of a 
top IRS executive, “They have been very 
supportive and have been a true partner with us. 
We use them strategically.”51 With such close ties, 
it would have been reasonable to question 
whether Mitre could undertake and deliver a 
truly independent review of any IRS program, 
particularly one fraught with so many political 
and public implications.
It was even more reasonable to question 
Mitre’s independence in the specific context of 
Free File. Indeed, the company has opined 
previously on the program and specifically on 
whether to expand it and increase user 
participation. In a two-part study that examined 
policy alternatives to increasing e-filing 
generally,52 Mitre analyzed potential effects on 
Free File participation from, for instance, altering 
adjusted gross income limitations or dropping 
them altogether, manipulating other eligibility 
criteria, increasing the number of forms and 
schedules supported by the program, and 
improving the user experience. Mitre was 
pessimistic about deploying an expanded Free 
File to increase e-filing, largely due to industry 
concerns over how the policy would affect profits. 
FFA companies had “a financial disincentive to 
expand Free File eligibility requirements,” Mitre 
concluded, because expansion “will cut into the 
pool of potential customers who will pay for the 
services and products they sell.”53
Mitre came to the same conclusion in the 
above study concerning whether the IRS should 
operate its own e-filing program without the 
assistance of the FFA. “Commercial software 
vendors and transmitters will likely expend 
considerable resources opposing this Option,” 
Mitre wrote, and it would “adversely affect IRS 
partnerships with key stakeholders such as tax 
preparation software vendors and transmitters” 
on whom the IRS relied “for much of its taxpayer 
outreach.”54 In the end, Mitre summarized in its 
2019 Free File report, it “was neither cost-
beneficial, nor could the IRS keep pace with the 
innovation of the private sector,” for the agency to 
pursue its own e-filing system.55 Mitre’s cynicism 
toward government-run e-filing programs is 
noteworthy in its own right. But it is particularly 
relevant in light of the political battle in 2019 over 
codification of the Free File program during 
which opponents argued that codification would 
prevent the IRS from offering a truly free e-filing 
system, the optimal outcome for many members 
of Congress.56
Therefore, before the release of Mitre’s Free 
File report, observers were right to question 
whether Mitre could produce the kind of 
independent review that the Free File program 
sorely needed. After the report’s issuance, those 
concerns were reinforced and amplified. Mitre’s 
review of Free File amounted to advocacy rather 
50
See Merion, supra note 48. See also Kat Lucero, “Tax Refund Anti-
Fraud Pilot ISAC Seen as Boon for States,” 6 MLex US Tax Watch 7 (May 
11, 2018) (specifically discussing IRSAC and Mitre’s role). IRS field 
directive, “Use of Sampling Methodologies in Research Credit Cases,” at 
7-8, 10-11 (Mar. 2002) (discussing the IRS “Mitre Expert Program” and its 
use in R&D audits). I discussed with several practitioners familiar with 
the process how the IRS used Mitre in its R&D credit audits. None of 
them thought Mitre acted objectively in assessing whether a particular 
activity qualifies for the R&D credit. In fact, one practitioner said 
pointedly that Mitre “relentlessly remembers who’s paying it.”
51
Merion, supra note 48 (quoting IRS Chief Information Officer Gina 
Garza).
52
Mitre, “Advancing E-File Study Phase 2 Report: An Examination of 
the Options to Increase Electronic Filing of Individual Returns,” at 76 
and 161-168 (Dec. 15, 2010) (Mitre phase 2 report); Mitre, “Advancing E-
File Study Phase 1 Report: Achieving the 80 Percent E-File Goal Requires 
Partnering With Stakeholders on New Approaches to Motivate Paper 
Filers,” at 134-135 (Sept. 30, 2008) (Mitre phase 1 report).
53
Mitre phase 1 report, supra note 52, at 135. See also Mitre phase 2 
report, supra note 52, at 166-167 (opining that FFA members “may be 
unwilling to support expansion of the existing Free File Program, 
because this may encroach on their ability to sell their own products and 
produce revenue,” and that this policy alternative “may adversely affect 
IRS partnerships with key stakeholders such as tax preparation software 
vendors and transmitters”).
54
Mitre phase 2 report, supra note 52, at 72. See also id. at 122-123 and 
125-127. For Mitre’s full discussion of this issue, see id. at 111-131.
55
Final report, supra note 42, at 11.
56
See, e.g., Tax Filing Simplification Act of 2019, S. 1194 (sponsored by 
Sens. Warren et al. and endorsing government-run return filing and 
“pre-prepared” tax returns for taxpayers with “simple tax situations”); 
William Hoffman, “Treasury Misses Dems’ Deadline for Handing Over 
Trump’s Returns,” Tax Notes, Apr. 15, 2019, p. 439 (quoting Wyden as 
wanting to replace Free File with an IRS-run “simple return” system); 
Cooper and Stokeld, supra note 24, at 471 (reporting Ocasio-Cortez as 
saying the IRS “should automatically file taxes for low-income 
taxpayers”); Casten statement, supra note 26 (envisioning a government-
run system “that would enable millions of citizens to access free filing 
services”); and Warren’s staff, “Tax Maze: How the Tax Prep Industry 
Blocks Government From Making Tax Day Easier” (Apr. 4, 2016) 
(endorsing government-run tax return filing).
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than analysis. Mitre accepted uncritically and 
without serious inquiry FFA companies’ 
characterization of the purposes and goals of the 
Free File program. Without inspection, moreover, 
Mitre credited FFA companies’ explanations for 
their behavior, the same behavior that has become 
the subject of multiple government investigations 
and lawsuits, as well as litigation initiated by 
aggrieved taxpayers.
Far from criticizing FFA companies’ behavior, 
Mitre lauded it. Mitre praised the companies for 
maximizing returns on their Free File investment 
at the expense of eligible Free File users and other 
low-income taxpayers. In the process, Mitre 
confirmed that FFA companies took affirmative 
acts to undermine the Free File program by hiding 
their Free File websites from eligible Free File 
users. Mitre further revealed that FFA companies 
spent more than $17 million on paid search 
advertisements in 2019 to position their “free 
commercial” sites atop internet search results for 
free tax filing, further depressing Free File usage 
and increasing the likelihood that eligible Free 
File users would end up paying to file returns. By 
showing that economic incentives motivate FFA 
companies to participate in Free File, Mitre also 
undercut arguments from FFA companies that 
they view Free File as a “philanthropic endeavor.” 
Moreover, having concluded that FFA companies 
primarily participate in Free File to extract 
economic benefits, Mitre warned the IRS against 
challenging the companies’ free-to-fee tactics.
This report concludes that Mitre’s warning 
was unnecessary. The IRS has refused to exercise 
any meaningful oversight of its FFA partners’ 
interactions with eligible Free File taxpayers, 
leaving vulnerable taxpayer populations to 
largely fend for themselves every filing season. In 
this way, the IRS is complicit in the FFA’s actions.
FFA Companies Hid Free File Sites, Violated MOU
Mitre’s Free File report did nothing to 
contradict earlier investigative reporting and 
congressional findings that FFA companies hid 
their Free File websites from low-income 
taxpayers and violated the Free File MOU. In fact, 
the report bolsters those revelations.
First, Mitre confirmed that FFA companies 
concealed their Free File websites from eligible 
Free File users. Congressional leaders had 
criticized these practices as potentially violating 
laws designed to prevent “unfair and deceptive 
practices or unfair methods of competition,” and 
evidencing that FFA companies “may have 
entered into an illegal agreement” to engage in 
these unlawful acts, in other words, a conspiracy.57 
Earlier reports indicated that at least five of the 12 
FFA companies engaged in practices that kept 
their Free File sites from appearing in internet 
searches for the Free File program.58 Mitre found 
that the number of FFA companies perpetrating 
such acts was eight rather than five.
Inexplicably, Mitre buried that critical finding 
more than 100 pages into its report, and then 
misled readers at various points into believing 
that only five FFA companies concealed their Free 
File sites from eligible Free File users.59 The fact of 
the matter is that six FFA companies deployed at 
least one of several “common techniques used to 
discourage discovery on organic internet 
searches,”60 while two additional FFA companies 
used less common methods to prevent their Free 
File landing pages from being “discoverable” 
through internet searches.61 These “steps to inhibit 
indexation of their Free File offering in the main 
organic search results” were wildly successful.62 
One of the “more commonly used methods” 
57
See letter to FTC, supra note 7.
58
Id.
59
Mitre focused on the five FFA companies that used a common 
technique to hide Free File sites from internet searches (i.e., a 
“NOINDEX” code) rather than consider and discuss the full universe of 
FFA companies that prevented their Free File sites from appearing in 
search results. See, e.g., final report, supra note 42, at iv (“During [filing 
season] 2019, five of the 12 FFA members did engage in a practice that 
excludes their company’s Free File landing page in organic searches.”); 
and id. at vii, xxii, 45, 47, 84 (same).
60
Final report, supra note 42, at Appendix D-1 (identifying these 
practices as “Robots.txt ‘Disallow’ Statements” (described as “a test file, 
usually located in the root folder level, informing search bots which files 
and file folders can or cannot be crawled”), “Meta Robtos NOINDEX” 
(or “a directive placed in the HEAD section of a web page providing 
instructions to bots at the page level not to include that page in the 
search index”), and “Rel ‘Canonical’ tags” (or “a method of 
communicating which page among a set of duplicate pages is preferred 
for indexation. A page canonicalized to another page will be omitted 
from the search index.”)).
61
Id. at Appendix D-1 to D-2 (discussing “other methods to prevent 
indexation”).
62
Mitre, “Independent Assessment of the Free File Program, 
Appendix A: The Economics of Free File,” at 36 (Sept. 13, 2019) 
(Appendix A).
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resulted in “thirty-two times more traffic being 
driven to the commercial products versus the Free 
File services.”63
By making it harder for eligible Free File users 
to locate FFA companies’ Free File websites, while 
at the same time making it significantly easier to 
land on the companies’ “free commercial” sites, 
FFA companies hindered Free File participation. 
In turn, by engaging in behavior that decreased 
rather than increased Free File participation, FFA 
companies violated express provisions of the Free 
File MOU.64 For just two examples, impairing 
taxpayer participation in the Free File program 
violated articles 2.1 and 2.3 of the MOU, 
provisions that obligate Free File companies to 
expand Free File usability, service, and access.65 
Violations of the MOU’s provisions, moreover, 
either by the IRS or the FFA, are legally actionable, 
as reflected by the express intent of the Free File 
partners to be “legally bound” by the MOU’s 
terms and conditions.66
Actively depressing the number of taxpayers 
who participate in the Free File program also 
violated the underlying spirit of the most recent 
MOU, which, according to the IRS, pledged FFA 
companies to “strengthen and expand taxpayer 
options” under the program.67 Reducing taxpayer 
participation even violated the basic premise of 
the Free File program and the public-private 
partnership under which the program operates. 
In each of the eight Free File MOUs, the MOU 
mandates: “Members shall work in concert with 
the IRS to increase electronic filing of tax returns, 
which includes extending the benefits of online 
federal tax preparation and electronic filing to 
economically disadvantaged and underserved 
populations at no cost to either the individual 
user or to the public treasury.”68 In contravention 
of this directive, FFA companies concealed their 
Free File websites from eligible Free File users and 
pushed those “economically disadvantaged and 
underserved” taxpayers toward FFA companies’ 
paid commercial sites (as detailed later).
Mitre defended the actions of FFA companies 
with improbable explanations.
First, Mitre claimed that FFA companies “are 
not bound” by “the responsibility of reducing the 
government’s or taxpayers’ burden through 
increased e-filings at no cost to the taxpayer. This 
is solely the government’s objective and not the 
organizational goals of the” FFA.69 That is true, but 
only in the strictest sense. FFA companies have an 
affirmative duty to refrain from, at the very least, 
increasing the government’s or taxpayers’ burden, 
a duty that they violated by hiding their Free File 
sites from eligible Free File users and pushing 
taxpayers to FFA companies’ commercial sites, 
actions that Mitre acknowledged increased 
burdens on taxpayers.70 Moreover, as discussed 
later, every Free File MOU has expressly obligated 
FFA companies to “extend the benefits of online 
federal tax preparation and electronic filing to 
economically disadvantaged and underserved 
populations at no cost to either the individual 
user or to the public treasury.”71 Like it or not, FFA 
companies are bound to uphold these objectives 
and make them part of their organizational goals. 
Failure to uphold these objectives (especially, 
although not exclusively, if the failure is willful, as 
is the case here) violates the MOU.
Second, Mitre claimed that FFA efforts to 
conceal Free File websites from eligible Free File 
users and to push them toward paid commercial 
63
Id.
64
Eighth MOU, supra note 2, at preamble.
65
See id. at art. 2.1 (“Members shall . . . [m]ake tax return preparation 
and filing easier and reduce the burden on individual taxpayers, 
particularly the economically disadvantaged and underserved 
populations,”) and art. 2.3 (“Members shall . . . [p]rovide greater service 
and access to the [Free File] Services to taxpayers.”).
66
Id. at preamble (stating that the parties entered into the MOU 
“intending to be legally bound”). Mitre incorrectly stated the Free File 
MOU “is not a contract . . . but a mutually negotiated tool for governance 
agreed upon by the two partners.” Final report, supra note 42, at 6. The 
truth is that an MOU can bind parties contractually depending on the 
intention of the parties as indicated in the express provisions of the 
MOU. The Free File MOU clearly states that the IRS and FFA entered 
into the agreement “intending to be legally bound” by its terms and 
conditions.
67
IR-2018-213.
68
Eighth MOU, supra note 2, at 5. See also Seventh MOU, at 5 (Mar. 6, 
2015); Sixth MOU, at 5 (May 2, 2014); Fifth MOU, at 5 (Oct. 20, 2009); 
Fourth MOU, at 5 (Jan. 13, 2009); Third MOU, at 3 (Jan. 2, 2008); Second 
MOU, at 3 (Jan. 12, 2007); and First MOU, at 4 (Dec. 20, 2005).
69
Appendix A, supra note 62, at 31-32.
70
Mitre distinguished FFA companies’ Free File offerings from those 
found on the companies’ commercial sites by saying the former 
“eliminate the monetary cost of filing taxes in the form of guaranteed 
zero preparation and filing fees,” and “unlike the commercial offerings, 
Free File guarantees protection from hidden costs and fees for using the 
program.” Id. at 13.
71
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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sites did not necessarily depress Free File 
participation.72 To support this claim, Mitre 
reported that its analysis of “organic” (that is, 
unpaid) searches for the IRS Free File website 
during the 2019 filing season found “the vast 
majority of those searching for free tax filing 
landed on commercial sites, and no searches 
landed on sites of the five companies that 
excluded their Free File landing pages.”73 (Here 
again,74 Mitre accounted for only the five FFA 
companies that deployed the “NOINDEX” tactic 
to hide Free File websites, and it omitted the 
additional three FFA companies that used other 
methods to conceal their Free File sites.) In fact, 
according to Mitre, only 3 percent of all organic 
searches directed taxpayers to an FFA company’s 
Free File site, while 97 percent of organic searches 
directed them to FFA companies’ commercial 
sites.75 In other words, the scheme worked as 
anyone would have predicted: Negligible 
numbers of taxpayers found FFA companies’ Free 
File websites when searching for the Free File 
program, and instead were bombarded with 
search results for the companies’ commercial 
sites, which, as Mitre conceded, subjected 
taxpayers to “hidden fees that are characteristic of 
[FFA companies’] commercial options.”76 
Ultimately, Mitre’s own numbers contradict its 
claim that FFA companies’ efforts to conceal Free 
File websites from eligible Free File users had no 
effect on Free File participation.
In another flimsy attempt to discredit the 
notion that hiding Free File sites from internet 
searches did not influence Free File usage, Mitre 
estimated that more taxpayers trafficked 
IRS.gov’s Free File landing page (780,000) than 
any individual FFA company’s commercial page 
(698,000).77 But that finding is irrelevant. For 
starters, the pertinent comparison is traffic on 
IRS.gov (780,000) versus all FFA companies’ 
commercial pages (1,812,218).78 Moreover, Mitre’s 
estimate accounted only for unpaid (or organic) 
search traffic, not paid search traffic. It turns out 
that organic searches generated 1,812,218 visits to 
FFA companies’ commercial sites, while paid 
searches generated an additional 10,267,117 visits 
to the companies’ commercial sites, or 5.66 times 
the traffic for paid searches versus organic 
searches.79 (See below for FFA companies 
spending more than $17 million on paid search 
advertisements to position their “free 
commercial” sites atop internet search results for 
free tax filing.) And because no FFA company 
paid for internet traffic to be directed to Free File 
sites80 and the IRS does not allocate funds to paid 
advertising,81 that means the number of searches 
that went to IRS.gov totaled 780,000 versus 
12,069,335 visits for the number of organic and 
paid searches to FFA companies’ commercial 
sites. For more evidence that FFA companies 
hiding their Free File sites made it harder for 
eligible Free File users to find and participate in 
Free File, consider that Mitre’s own estimates 
indicate that organic searches for those websites 
yielded a paltry 56,000 visits.82
Finally, Mitre touted that among the 
companies that hid their Free File websites, most 
of them processed more Free File returns than the 
previous year.83 But again, that is the wrong 
comparison, a distraction from what we really 
need to know — that is, how many Free File 
returns would those companies have processed 
72
Final report, supra note 42, at 47 (“It must also be pointed out that 
excluding the Free File landing pages may not have translated into fewer 
Free File returns for those companies.”).
73
Id. at 46-47.
74
See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text (discussing how eight 
rather than five FFA companies’ efforts prevented their Free File sites 
from being discovered by taxpayers’ internet searches, as well as how 
Mitre used the lower number almost exclusively throughout its report).
75
Final report, supra note 42, at 44 (reporting that of the nearly 1.9 
million visits from organic searches to an FFA company’s websites, 
56,095 went to FFA companies’ Free File landing pages compared to 
1,812,218 going to FFA companies’ commercial sites).
76
Appendix A, supra note 62, at 12.
77
Final report, supra note 42, at 47. For the search traffic, see id. at vii.
78
Id. at 44.
79
Id.
80
See id. at viii (reporting that “no member had paid advertising for 
their Free File landing pages”); and id. at 44 (same).
81
See Taxpayer Advocate Service, “2018 Annual Report to Congress,” 
vol. 1, at 65 (Feb. 2019) (reporting “the IRS has not committed funding to 
advertise FFI”); and Olson statement, supra note 40, at 21 (same).
82
Final report, supra note 42, at 44. Even that number is inflated, 
because Mitre’s web analysis accounted for only the five FFA companies 
that deployed the “NOINDEX” scheme, while omitting the additional 
three FFA companies that used other methods to conceal their sites. See 
supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
83
Id. at 47 (“Of the five companies who used the NOINDEX, four 
increased their free filed returns in the 2019 filing season, and one 
remained relatively flat.”).
SPECIAL REPORT
TAX NOTES FEDERAL, FEBRUARY 10, 2020  835
had they not concealed their websites from 
eligible Free File users and then paid millions of 
dollars to get their commercial sites to appear at 
the top of search results for free tax filing. Mitre 
had nothing meaningful to say about such an 
inquiry, except that “it’s impossible to know 
whether the increases would have been greater 
had the landing pages not been excluded.”84
That’s baloney. Had Mitre extended its 
analysis slightly further, it absolutely could have 
shed light on this question. Using Mitre’s own 
web analytics,85 I typed “free tax filing” into 
Google, which Mitre said generated the highest 
traffic for FFA landing pages during the 2019 
filing season (1,177,297 visits). The top four 
discovered websites reflected paid ads for 
commercial sites, including two FFA companies, 
Intuit (first) and H&R Block (third). The fifth 
result was the IRS Free File landing page. Thus, 
removing the four paid searches would have 
raised the IRS landing page to the top of the list, a 
reordering that by itself would increase Free File 
usage and probably by a substantial amount 
(recall that Mitre found paid search 
advertisements appearing at the top of search 
results generated 5.66 times more traffic to FFA 
companies’ commercial sites than all organic 
search traffic86). I then clicked through the first 25 
pages of search results (representing more than 
300 websites), and not a single FFA Free File 
landing page appeared. I saw websites for 
commercial vendors hawking “free” tax return 
filing, sites for state tax departments, cities, 
counties, the United Way, the “One Source” 
military portal, AARP, Goodwill, libraries, 
foodbanks, the Volunteer Income Tax Assistance 
program (VITA), Tax Counseling for the Elderly 
(TCE), and even free services for tax return filing 
in foreign jurisdictions. But no FFA Free File 
landing pages. And yet Mitre said it was unable 
take a position on whether removing at least 
eight87 of the official 13 Free File landing pages 
(including the IRS landing page) lowered Free File 
participation.
Implausible Explanations for FFA Tactics
Mitre saw nothing wrong with FFA 
companies concealing their Free File sites from 
eligible Free File users. Nor did Mitre explore how 
that practice might evidence a conspiracy among 
FFA companies to commit unlawful acts. Mitre 
further failed to meaningfully investigate or take 
seriously the various ways that FFA companies 
violated provisions of the Free File MOU, a legally 
binding document. Instead, Mitre accepted 
uncritically and without hesitation FFA 
companies’ false and implausible explanations for 
their actions.
According to Mitre, it queried FFA companies 
why they hid their Free File websites from 
internet searches conducted by eligible Free File 
taxpayers. The companies reported that such 
behavior “keeps them in compliance with the 
MOU (language in the MOU preamble) and in 
alignment with IRS marketing that states Free File 
is ‘accessible only through IRS.gov.’”88 Mitre 
accepted this explanation without further inquiry 
or analysis.
Had Mitre conducted even a modicum of 
critical investigation into the validity of FFA 
companies’ explanation for why they concealed 
their Free File sites, it would have been forced to 
conclude — and report — that the explanations 
were alternately false and implausible.
First, the language in the MOU to which FFA 
companies presumably referred does not in any 
way prohibit FFA companies from hosting Free 
File websites accessible by taxpayers from 
locations other than the IRS site. Specifically, the 
MOU states that FFA companies “will offer the 
[Free File] Services and the IRS will provide 
taxpayers with links to the Services offered by the 
Alliance participants through a webpage, which is 
hosted at irs.gov with links from www.usa.gov.”89 
This language outlines affirmative duties of FFA 
companies and the IRS without limiting how 
84
Id.
85
Id. at 43.
86
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
87
See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text (discussing how eight 
FFA companies prevented their Free File sites from being discovered by 
taxpayers’ internet searches).
88
Final report, supra note 42, at iv. See also id. at 46 (“When questioned 
about the practice, most members reported they believed that excluding 
their Free File landing pages from search results kept them in accordance 
with the MOU.”); and id. at 84 (same).
89
Eighth MOU, supra note 2, at preamble.
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taxpayers can access FFA companies’ Free File 
sites.
Further, the relevant language in the MOU has 
remained virtually unchanged since the 
program’s origin in 2002.90 Thus, if we are to 
believe FFA companies’ explanation for why they 
hid their Free File sites from taxpayers, those 
companies have been violating the MOU for 
nearly the entire existence of the Free File 
program. Indeed, Intuit placed into service its 
“TurboTax Freedom Edition” Free File offering in 
2004, accessible to taxpayers through online 
searches and not solely through IRS.gov.91 In fact, 
as late as the 2019 filing season, Intuit’s website 
provided a direct link — albeit difficult to find 
due to Intuit’s acts of concealment — to its Free 
File website.92 And as of January 1, 2020, at least 
six FFA companies — including Intuit — hosted 
websites offering taxpayers direct access to their 
Free File products through internet searches.93 
Following the FFA’s explanation for why its 
members concealed Free File sites from taxpayers, 
those six FFA companies would be in violation of 
the Free File MOU. Mitre failed to make that 
connection.
Mitre also failed to reconcile FFA companies’ 
implausible explanation for why they concealed 
Free File sites with contradictory statements made 
by a leading member of the FFA. In May 2019, as 
the controversy swirled around FFA companies’ 
potentially unfair and deceptive trade practices, 
Intuit CEO Sasan Goodarzi attempted to defend 
his company’s actions. In a video sent to Intuit 
employees — and obtained and published by the 
investigative news organization ProPublica — 
Goodarzi explained why Intiut concealed its Free 
File website from eligible Free File users: “To 
avoid confusion between the IRS Free File 
program and our own free product, we also 
decided to have the landing page for the IRS 
product we offer not rank in search results.”94
That explanation is as disingenuous as the one 
Mitre accepted uncritically from FFA companies. 
For one thing, the “free product” to which 
Goodarzi refers is one of Intuit’s “free commercial 
products” (itself a contradiction in terms) offered 
on a website that aggressively pushes taxpayers 
away from Intuit’s free products toward its paid 
products, a practice that ProPublica also 
documented.95 For our purposes here, it is enough 
to observe that Intuit’s CEO said nothing about 
hiding the company’s Free File site in order to 
avoid violating the Free File MOU.
Second, Mitre accepted indiscriminately FFA 
companies’ additional explanation that they hid 
their Free File sites as a way to remain “in 
alignment with IRS marketing that states Free File 
is ‘accessible only through IRS.gov.’”96 That 
explanation lacks credibility, as discussed in more 
detail later. But Mitre extended the explanation to 
encompass a considerably more problematic 
defense of FFA companies’ behavior — that is, 
eligible Free File taxpayers have never been 
protected by the terms and conditions of the MOU 
unless and until they enter the Free File program 
through IRS.gov. Or as Mitre put it: “Only 
taxpayers that access a Free File offering (online 
software product) with a direct link from the 
IRS.gov landing page are actually participants in 
the Free File program.”97
Such a claim leads to several troubling 
conclusions. For example, if an eligible Free File 
user went directly to, say, Intuit’s Free File landing 
page at taxfreedom.com and used Intuit’s 
90
The original agreement, supra note 27, was entered into October 20, 
2002, and stated, “The IRS will provide taxpayers with links to the Free 
Services offered by the Consortium Participants through a web page . . . 
which will be hosted at irs.gov accessible through firstgov.gov.” 67 F.R. 
at 67249. In 2005 the IRS and FFA entered into the First MOU, supra note 
68, which included a preamble describing the affirmative duties of the 
IRS and FFA companies that is nearly identical to the above-quoted 
language from the original agreement.
91
See Memorandum in Support of Demurrer to the Complaint at 9, 
Intuit, No. 19STCV15644 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, July 8, 2019). 
Before the 2019 filing season, Intuit changed the name of its Free File 
offering to “TurboTax Free File Program.” Id.
92
See “What Is the TurboTax Free File Program?” TurboTax Help 
(accessed Nov. 18, 2019). See also Class Action Complaint and Demand 
for Jury Trial at 8, Nichols v. Intuit Inc., No. 19-cv-2666 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 
2019) (sharing a screenshot of a TurboTax FAQ, “What Is the TurboTax 
Free File Program?” which includes a direct link to taxfreedom.com, 
Intuit’s Free File site).
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For the simple search terms that yielded results for these 
companies’ Free File sites as well as the associated URL, see “turbo tax 
free file”; “h&r block free file”; “1040NOW free file”; “taxact free file”; 
“fileyourtaxes.com free file”; and “olt free file.”
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Elliott and Waldron, supra note 9.
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See, e.g., Elliott and Tsutsumi, supra note 10; Elliott and Meg Marco, 
“Listen to TurboTax Lie to Get Out of Refunding Overcharged 
Customers,” ProPublica, May 9, 2019; Elliott and Kiel, supra note 8; 
Ariana Tobin, Elliott, and Meg Marco, “Here Are Your Stories of Being 
Tricked Into Paying by TurboTax. You Often Needed the Money,” 
ProPublica, Apr. 26, 2019; and Elliott and Waldron, supra note 5.
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Final report, supra note 42, at iv. See also id. at 46 (same).
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Id. at 4.
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TurboTax Free File Program (which the website 
indicates is “Part of IRS Free File”), according to 
Mitre, the MOU’s protections against Intuit 
marketing and upselling paid products to this 
Free File user would not apply, and Intuit could 
treat this taxpayer as aggressively as it treats 
taxpayers visiting its commercial site. Equally 
troubling, Intuit has adopted this claim as part of 
its legal defense against multiple lawsuits 
alleging that the company violated laws 
pertaining to deceptive trade practices and unfair 
competition in its interactions with eligible Free 
File taxpayers. Indeed, peppered throughout its 
legal filings, Intuit asserts that taxpayers can 
become Free File taxpayers only if they access 
Free File offerings through IRS.gov.98
All of this is news to me and presumably to 
anyone following the program over the last 17 
years, supporters and critics alike. To be sure, the 
IRS issued press releases in late 2018 and early 
2019 (the first announcing an updated Free File 
MOU,99 the second signaling the 2019 filing season 
with an “improved version of IRS Free File”100) 
that stated, “To use Free File, taxpayers must use 
IRS.gov to connect to a company offering Free 
File.” But that statement was buried in press 
releases highlighting substantive changes to the 
program and can hardly be said to constitute a 
formal alteration to long-standing policy and 
practice. Indeed, if the IRS wished to formalize an 
alleged shift in policy that severely restricted how 
taxpayers participate in the Free File program, the 
agency presumably would have done so as part of 
the process for revising the Free File MOU in late 
2018. But it didn’t.
Claiming that taxpayers can participate in 
Free File only by directly linking from IRS.gov 
lacks credibility. Further, claiming that FFA 
companies hid their Free File sites from internet 
searches due to a fundamental change in the Free 
File program is specious. Nonetheless, Mitre’s 
“independent” review of the Free File program 
accepted and repeated both claims.
FFA Companies Lured Free Filers to Paid Sites
The tactics FFA companies deployed to hide 
their Free File sites from eligible Free File users 
resulted in fewer taxpayers locating and 
participating in the IRS Free File program.101 In 
fact, despite Mitre’s efforts to obscure this 
conclusion, Mitre acknowledged — albeit buried 
in an appendix to the report — that FFA 
companies’ maneuvers “put downward pressure 
on Free File usage.”102 In exchange for fewer Free 
File sites, eligible Free File users were bombarded 
with search results for FFA companies’ “free 
commercial” sites and those sites’ predatory 
upselling tactics. Also on those sites, eligible Free 
File users were not protected by the terms and 
conditions of the Free File MOU, and FFA 
companies were free to undertake any and all 
efforts within the bounds of the law to lure 
eligible Free File taxpayers into paying for tax 
return filing services they would have received 
for free under the Free File program. These sites 
were devised to look free, emblazoned with 
reassuring signage such as “TurboTax Free 
Edition. Free Federal. Free State. Free to File. 
FREE guaranteed. $0 $0 $0,”103 but which deployed 
design tricks known as “dark patterns” to get low-
income taxpayers to purchase FFA companies’ 
paid products they neither needed nor wanted.104
Mitre reported that FFA companies’ appetite 
for extracting revenue from eligible Free File users 
did not stop there. Mitre estimated that FFA 
members spent $17.3 million on paid search 
advertisements during the 2019 filing season to 
position their “free commercial” sites atop 
internet search results for free tax filing services.105 
According to Mitre, the “pay-per-click search 
advertising and search engine optimization 
98
See, e.g., Joint Case Management Statement at 4, In re Intuit Free File 
Litigation, No. 3:19-cv-02546 (stating that the arrangement between the 
IRS and FFA “allowed taxpayers to access FFA members’ free services 
through the IRS website, ‘via a [Free File] homepage managed and 
hosted’ by the agency”); and Memorandum in Support of Demurrer, 
supra note 91, at 8 (same).
99
IR-2018-213.
100
See IR-2019-2.
101
See supra notes 72-87 and accompanying text.
102
Appendix A, supra note 62, at 36.
103
See, e.g., supra note 46.
104
See Elliott and Waldron, supra note 5.
105
Final report, supra note 42, at 43. See also Appendix A, supra note 
62, at 36 n.37 (reporting “over $17 million”). The precise number is 
$17.35 million based off $1.69 (the average cost per click for a free tax 
return filing search advertisement) multiplied by 10,267,117 (the number 
of visits to FFA companies’ commercial sites generated by paid search 
advertisements). See id. at 44.
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techniques (collectively known as search 
marketing)” allow “web publishers [in this case, 
FFA companies] to acquire large amounts of 
traffic from the major web search engines and 
exert control to which pages on their websites this 
traffic is directed” (that is, FFA companies’ “free 
commercial” sites that are not subject to the 
strictures of the MOU).106 Mitre estimated that the 
paid search advertisements generated five107 times 
more traffic to FFA companies’ commercial sites 
than organic searches.108
Mitre saw nothing wrong with these 
aggressive marketing tactics. At the same time, it 
failed to conduct any analysis of whether 
taxpayers might conflate FFA companies’ “free 
commercial” sites with the companies’ Free File 
sites, only the latter of which protected taxpayers 
from the companies’ aggressive upselling of paid 
products and “value-added” services. Nor did 
Mitre analyze the extent to which the conspicuous 
promises of “Free Federal. Free State. Free to File. 
FREE guaranteed. $0 $0 $0” blanketing FFA 
companies’ “free commercial” sites might result 
in taxpayers being manipulated, cajoled, and 
tricked into buying or signing up for something 
they never intended. These practices are 
particularly insidious because FFA companies 
know that they are dealing with the most 
vulnerable taxpayers, who are generally some 
combination of low-income, financially 
unsophisticated, nonnative English-speaking 
persons not in the market for commercial 
products but merely a free, safe opportunity to 
fulfill their tax return filing obligations. Instead, 
they are besieged by FFA companies’ seemingly 
endless attempts to extract profits from them. 
These attempts are nauseating and include 
(reflecting two prominent FFA companies):
• importing prior-year tax return information 
— $24.99;
• upgrading to account for education 
expenses — $19.99;
• upgrading to account for student loan 
interest — $59.99;
• upgrading to account for small business 
income — $19.99;
• upgrading to account for small business 
expenses — $34.99;
• cross-marketing third-party gift cards, 
purchased by “some or all of your federal 
refund”;
• upselling “Free Edition State Return” — 
$29.99;
• cross-marketing third-party access to 
“credit score and personalized financial 
recommendation”;
• upselling “Tax Identity Shield” — $14.99;
• upselling “Worry-Free Audit Support” — 
$19.99;
• upselling “Tax Identity Shield + Worry-Free 
Audit Support” — $24.99;
• upselling FFA company’s branded credit 
card by “load[ing] your refund onto the 
award-winning” card;
• upselling “Tax Pro,” to “review and sign 
your return. They’ll find your best outcome 
for this year” — $49.99; and
• upselling storage of return for six years — 
$12.49.
Moreover, in many cases, the cost of 
upgrading FFA companies’ “value-added” 
products ends up exceeding any tax savings 
associated with the upgrade.109 In other words, 
taxpayers are worse off and affirmatively harmed.
Rather than scrutinize the ways FFA 
companies expose eligible Free File users and 
other vulnerable taxpayers to these practices, 
Mitre lauded the effort. “Paid advertising yields 
results,” Mitre wrote approvingly.110 Because of 
FFA companies’ paid search advertising, “85 
percent of the traffic followed a paid search result 
to a member site, while the other 15 percent of 
visits to member sites came from an organic 
106
Id. at 42.
107
Mitre underreported the multiplier, which, according to Mitre’s 
own data, reached 5.6654 times rather than five times (i.e., estimated 
traffic to FFA commercial sites generated by paid searches (10,267,117) 
divided by traffic generated by organic searches (1,812,218)). Id. at 44.
108
Id. at viii, xviii, 43, and 81.
109
See, e.g., Elliott and Kiel, “Trump’s Tax Law Threatened TurboTax’s 
Profits. So the Company Started Charging the Disabled, the 
Unemployed and Students,” ProPublica, July 16, 2019 (reporting Intuit 
upsold a student-taxpayer with $12,000 in taxable income its “Deluxe” 
package for $59.99, which allowed the taxpayer to deduct her student 
loan interest, saving her $26, for a net loss of $33.99).
110
Final report, supra note 42, at 81.
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search result,” with taxpayers being more than 
“five times”111 as likely to click on a paid search 
result versus an organic result.112 In fact, Mitre so 
admired the practice that it recommended the IRS 
adopt the strategy for increasing traffic to its own 
Free File landing page.113 Of course, that is not the 
kind of advertising the Free File MOU encourages 
the IRS to conduct,114 nor the kind of advertising 
public agencies should spend money on. But 
Mitre was so enamored of the practice and its 
results for private sector companies that it 
attempted to foist it on the public sector despite 
the sharply different contexts in which the IRS 
and FFA companies deliver services to taxpayers.
In addition to revealing and then celebrating 
the $17.3 million that FFA companies spent on 
paid search ads directing traffic to their “free 
commercial” sites, Mitre reported that FFA 
companies spent zero dollars on paid ads to 
promote their Free File sites. According to Mitre’s 
analysis, “none of the FFA members purchased 
any paid search advertisements to take taxpayers 
to their FFA landing page.”115 Mitre defended FFA 
companies’ lack of paid advertising or promotion 
for Free File by stating that the companies “do not 
have an incentive to advertise the program,”116 
and that the MOU “assigns advertising 
responsibility to the IRS”117 and to “the IRS 
alone.”118
First, FFA companies have an affirmative 
incentive to advertise Free File as a way to fulfill 
their obligations under the Free File MOU to 
expand Free File access, service, and usability119 
and to “strengthen and expand taxpayer options” 
under the program.120 Second, Mitre intimated 
that FFA companies are prohibited from 
advertising and promoting Free File on their 
websites or through paid search advertisements. 
And while the MOU states that the IRS “will make 
consistent, good-faith efforts to promote the Free 
File Program” through press releases, social 
media and networking, interagency interactions, 
and technology applications,121 it does not in any 
way prevent FFA companies from promoting the 
program. In fact, important advisory 
organizations, including the IRS Advisory 
Council (IRSAC), have urged the FFA and its 
member companies to advertise and promote 
Free File as a way of fulfilling their obligations 
under the MOU to enhance the program,122 
particularly at a time of severe budget constraints 
at the IRS.123 But the FFA has refused.
In any event, Mitre failed to analyze FFA 
companies’ refusal to advertise the Free File 
program. Worse, Mitre failed to connect the dots 
between FFA companies (1) refusing to buy paid 
advertising for their Free File products, (2) 
making it virtually impossible for eligible Free 
File users to find Free File sites by hiding the sites 
from organic internet searches, and (3) spending 
$17.3 million in paid advertising to lure eligible 
Free File users to the companies’ “free 
commercial” sites where the companies were not 
bound by the MOU’s taxpayer protections. Just 
saying aloud those three affirmative acts reveals a 
plausible connection: Paying for ads to promote 
Free File would have been counterproductive to 
FFA companies’ efforts to hide the existence of the 
program from eligible Free File users and to lure 
them to “free commercial” sites where FFA 
companies can inveigle them into paying for 
“value-added” products they should be getting 
for free or that they never intended to purchase. 
Put more simply, given all the effort FFA 
companies expended on undermining Free File, 
111
See supra note 107 for how Mitre underreported the multiplier, 
which is closer to 5.66 times the traffic going to commercial sites.
112
Final report, supra note 42, at 81.
113
See id. at xviii (“Mitre recommends the IRS conduct a cost-benefit 
analysis to determine whether to purchase paid advertising to reach 
taxpayers searching for free tax filing.”); id. at 81 (same).
114
See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
115
Final report, supra note 42, at 44. See also id. at viii (“no member 
had paid advertising for their Free File landing pages”) and viii n.10 
(same). Mitre indicated that one FFA company claimed it paid to 
advertise the Free File program “through a number of methods,” but 
Mitre could not verify the company’s unsubstantiated claim. See id. at 
viii, 44, and 44 n.58.
116
Appendix A, supra note 62, at 35.
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Final report, supra note 42, at viii.
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Appendix A, supra note 62, at 35. See also final report, supra note 42, 
at 53 (same).
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See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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Eighth MOU, supra note 2, at art. 4.35. An earlier version of the 
MOU indicated, “Any final decision by IRS on this issue will depend on 
budgetary and other IRS considerations.” Seventh MOU, supra note 68, 
at art. 4.36.
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See IRSAC 2018, supra note 40, at 18 (recommending that the MOU 
“require the FFA to spend a certain percentage of its membership dues 
for advertising and promotion of the program”).
123
Id. at 9-13; IRSAC 2019 Public Report, at 13-36 (Nov. 2019) (IRSAC 
2019).
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advertising the program would have been money 
poorly spent.
Perhaps sensing that its whitewashing of FFA 
companies’ behavior would prompt some of these 
criticisms, Mitre emphasized that FFA companies 
helped a lot of taxpayers file returns for free in 
2019 through the companies’ “free commercial” 
sites. In fact, the FFA told Mitre that their 
members “provided free commercial filings last 
tax season to nearly 18 million taxpayers,”124 more 
than six times the number of taxpayers who filed 
through Free File.125 Moreover, Mitre equated the 
18 million free returns prepared on FFA 
companies’ “free commercial” sites to free returns 
prepared through government programs such as 
Free File, the VITA program, and TCE.126 Further, 
Mitre argued that to the extent taxpayers eligible 
for Free File end up using other alternatives to file 
their returns, that decision is purely voluntary. 
“Free File is just one choice taxpayers have to file 
their returns for free,”127 Mitre observed, and 
“many taxpayers eligible for Free File continue to 
file taxes through FFA members’ commercial 
offerings.”128
Mitre’s commentary on eligible Free File 
taxpayers filing returns on FFA companies’ “free 
commercial” sites is problematic. First, Mitre 
made no effort to verify FFA claims that its 
members filed “nearly 18 million returns” 
without charging taxpayers. Second, those 18 
million returns allegedly filed for free on FFA 
companies’ commercial sites were most certainly 
not the equivalent of filing 18 million returns 
through Free File, VITA, or TCE. For starters, 
there is no upselling, hidden fees, “value-added 
services,” dark patterns, or deceit with Free File, 
VITA, or TCE, unlike with FFA companies’ “free 
commercial” sites. Mitre itself made this 
distinction: “While most of the Free File 
companies provide free versions of their 
commercial offerings, taxpayers may be subject to 
hidden fees and costs of using these programs,” 
and “customers looking to file state returns . . . 
typically bear additional costs.”129 Moreover, 
eligible Free File taxpayers filing returns on FFA 
companies’ “free commercial” sites are not 
afforded the valuable protections contained in the 
Free File MOU and instead are subject to the 
nauseating upselling described earlier. To Mitre’s 
credit, it acknowledged that some not 
insignificant number of taxpayers eligible for Free 
File end up paying FFA companies to file their 
returns, and “could benefit from migrating to Free 
File.”130 But Mitre made no attempt to ascertain the 
actual number or to analyze the potential benefits.
Finally, it is preposterous to suggest that 
individual choice drives millions of taxpayers 
otherwise eligible for Free File to pay to file their 
return on FFA companies’ “free commercial” 
sites.131 Indeed, despite the significant 
shortcomings of Mitre’s report, it contains 
overwhelming evidence that FFA companies 
made substantial and affirmative efforts to make 
it harder for taxpayers to find and participate in 
the Free File program. From concealing their own 
Free File sites to spending millions of dollars on 
124
Final report, supra note 42, at 29. The actual number was 17.7 
million. Id. at x.
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Id. at 30.
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free online software for tax preparation and tax filing”). VITA celebrated 
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communities with an emphasis on low- and middle-income taxpayers 
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counseling and return prep to taxpayers 60 and older and specializes in 
questions about pensions and retirement-related issues. In 2018 
taxpayers filed 3.5 million returns using VITA and TCE. See IR-2018-215; 
and Joanna Ain, “After Providing Free Tax Prep for 50 Years, It’s Time to 
Make the VITA Program Permanent,” Prosperity Now, Mar. 27, 2019.
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protection from hidden costs and fees for using the program.”); and id. at 
12 (also stating Free File “comes without hidden fees that are 
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Id. at 35. See also id. (“The share of eligible filers that use the paid 
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“many eligible taxpayers are not reached by Free File and there is room 
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paid, commercial services”).
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paid search advertisements for their “free 
commercial” sites, to spending no money on such 
advertisements for the Free File program, FFA 
companies did everything within their power to 
shrink the number of taxpayers filing through 
Free File while increasing the number of 
taxpayers filing with their commercial products. 
In so doing, FFA companies substantially 
removed the option for eligible Free File users to 
file through Free File. At the same time, they 
significantly decreased the chances of being 
subject to the MOU’s taxpayer protections when 
dealing with eligible Free File taxpayers.
In fact, Mitre’s report condemned such actions 
as harmful to taxpayers. “Ultimately,” Mitre 
opined, “the revenue and profit motive of FFI 
members may not be detrimental to the objectives 
of Free File unless members are actively engaged 
in redirecting Free File eligible taxpayers to their 
commercial offerings. Such activities would cause 
harm to Free File candidates if they were 
misdirected to paying for premium services.”132 
Mitre’s own findings provide ample evidence to 
conclude that this is exactly what FFA companies 
were doing to taxpayers during the 2019 filing 
season. Ultimately, Mitre failed to connect its own 
findings and evidence to conclude what has been 
obvious for some time: FFA companies care 
considerably more about their bottom line than 
helping low-income taxpayers file returns for free.
Alleged Unlawful Business Practices
On the same day Mitre’s Free File report 
filtered into the public domain,133 the FFA issued a 
glowing press release celebrating how the report 
absolved FFA companies of any misconduct vis-à-
vis the Free File program or eligible Free File 
taxpayers. Mitre, “a respected non-profit research 
institute,” the FFA wrote, delivered “a diligent, 
highly detailed” report that “gave an overall 
favorable assessment” of the Free File program.134 
The report, the FFA continued, concluded that 
FFA companies were “compliant with the MOU,” 
and amounted to “a vote of confidence in a highly 
successful program.”135
In an attempt to frame the narrative around 
Mitre’s much-anticipated study, the FFA read the 
report too quickly. The FFA might be forgiven 
because it had to read, digest, and issue a 
statement on the 400-page study the same day it 
became public — unless it received a pre-release 
copy of the report from Mitre or the IRS, which 
would have been inappropriate given that the 
FFA and its member companies were the subject 
of Mitre’s “independent” review. In any event, 
while Mitre in fact concluded that FFA companies 
were “overall compliant to the terms of the 
MOU,”136 the evidence on which Mitre relied 
failed to substantiate that conclusion.
For starters, Mitre discovered troubling 
instances of FFA companies violating the MOU. 
For example, it found that FFA members were 
overcounting the number of Free File returns they 
processed, in one case counting returns that 
included refund anticipation loans — high-
interest, short-term consumer loans issued by a 
third party (in this case, FFA companies) against a 
taxpayer’s expected refund and payable upon 
receiving the refund from the IRS.137 Use of such 
loans by FFA companies has been banned since 
2007, when the IRS and FFA, under significant 
pressure from Congress and the national taxpayer 
advocate,138 signed a new MOU that prohibited 
the use of RALs (as well as refund anticipation 
checks and similar financial products).139 For 
another example of noncompliance associated 
with overcounting the true number of Free File 
returns, Mitre found that a different FFA 
132
Appendix A, supra note 62, at 35.
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See supra note 43 and accompanying text for the odd circumstances 
surrounding the release of Mitre’s final report on October 8, 2019.
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See FFA press release, supra note 43.
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see Mandi Matlock and Chi Chi Wu, “The Return of the Interest-Bearing 
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National Consumer Law Center (Apr. 3, 2019).
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company free-filed returns reflecting AGI 
exceeding $66,000, the income cutoff for Free File 
eligibility in tax year 2018.140
Mitre also identified a potentially serious 
instance of noncompliance but then failed to 
reveal how it investigated or resolved the 
situation. Specifically, Mitre reported that links to 
some FFA companies’ Free File landing pages 
reflected on the IRS.gov Free File landing page 
directed taxpayers to a different webpage of those 
FFA companies than the one indicated on the 
IRS.gov Free File landing page.141 Mitre neglected 
to share how many taxpayers were subject to the 
misdirection or how many FFA companies were 
involved. Importantly, if taxpayers were sent to 
FFA companies’ commercial landing pages from 
the IRS.gov Free File landing page rather than to a 
different URL that also sent taxpayers to the FFA 
companies’ Free File landing pages, it would 
represent a serious violation of the MOU. But 
Mitre failed to resolve the issue, or it resolved the 
issue and failed to disclose the resolution.
Mitre also downplayed the significance of 
seemingly serious acts of noncompliance by FFA 
companies. For example, the MOU requires an 
FFA company to alert taxpayers “at the earliest 
feasible point” when they become ineligible for 
that company’s Free File offer and what caused 
the ineligibility.142 The MOU further requires FFA 
companies to direct ineligible taxpayers back to 
the IRS Free File landing page as “the first and 
most prominent alternative action” so that 
ineligible taxpayers can consider Free File offers 
from other FFA members.143 Thereafter, the FFA 
companies may offer taxpayers to remain on their 
Free File sites to complete and file a return for free 
as long as the taxpayer is under the lowest 70 
percent of taxpayers by AGI, which, again, was 
$66,000 for tax year 2018.144 Mitre reported that 
two FFA companies violated these requirements 
by (1) failing to inform taxpayers with AGI 
exceeding $66,000 that they were ineligible, (2) 
failing to direct them back to the IRS Free File 
landing page, and (3) presumably permitting 
taxpayers with AGI exceeding $66,000 to 
complete a return for free while remaining on 
their Free File sites.145 Mitre also found that two 
FFA companies violated the same unequivocal 
requirements for a different part of the MOU, 
which imposes obligations on FFA companies 
consistent with the requirements described 
above.146
Both sets of violations reflect serious and 
specific noncompliance with the Free File MOU. 
Yet inexplicably, Mitre deemed the indisputable 
violations “inconclusive or not applicable for 
specific members”147 without further elaboration 
or explanation. In so doing, Mitre gave the 
noncompliant FFA companies — and, by 
extension, the FFA — a free pass.
In addition to minimizing clear violations of 
the MOU by FFA companies, Mitre (as far as one 
can tell from its report) failed to test or investigate 
compliance with some of the most important 
MOU provisions, particularly those designed to 
protect taxpayers from FFA companies’ 
aggressive tactics.
For example, one of the provisions added to 
the 2018 MOU addresses the long-standing 
practice of FFA companies sending to prior-year 
users of their Free File products emails that 
market the companies’ commercial products.148 
Specifically, the new provision prohibits FFA 
companies from using these emails “to 
communicate with the taxpayer about any non-
Free File commercial products or services,” and 
from including any “marketing, soliciting, sale or 
140
See final report, supra note 42, at 84.
141
Id. at 20.
142
Eighth MOU, supra note 2, at art. 4.19.2(i)-(ii).
143
Id. at art. 4.19.2(iii).
144
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pressing “submit” to file a return.
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File Program,” Tax Notes, Oct. 23, 2017, p. 543 (discussing “the common 
practice of FFA companies marketing their commercial products to 
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selling activity, or electronic links to such 
activity.”149 Rather, FFA companies may only 
“remind the taxpayer about the availability” of 
the companies’ Free File landing pages and offer 
to take them there.150
As another example, Mitre (again, as far as 
one can tell from its report) failed to test or 
investigate whether FFA companies were 
complying with a provision dealing with prior-
year Free File users visiting their FFA company’s 
commercial site the following year. In these 
situations, the taxpayer “must be given a first 
option to return to the Member’s Free File offer 
before receiving any other alternative choices for 
the Member’s publicly available commercial tax 
preparation products or services.”151
Both of these provisions aim to protect eligible 
Free File taxpayers from being tricked into 
purchasing FFA companies’ commercial 
products, actions that go to the heart of the public 
and congressional outrage over FFA companies 
hiding their Free File sites, luring Free File users to 
their commercial sites, and largely preventing 
taxpayers from entering the Free File program. 
Yet Mitre seems to have ignored both provisions 
in its review.
If that were not enough, Mitre vouched for the 
effectiveness of leaving FFA companies to their 
own devices and permitting them to police 
themselves and each other. Mitre also concluded 
that the IRS provides sufficient oversight of the 
Free File program by relying on a combination of 
FFA companies’ self-assessed compliance with 
the MOU and the IRS’s perfunctory reviews of the 
program.
As to FFA companies’ self-policing, Mitre 
observed favorably that “due to the competitive 
forces at work among FFA members, members are 
compelled to police each other regarding MOU 
compliance.”152 In addition, “as part of the annual 
application for membership,” FFA companies 
“must complete and sign a questionnaire that 
certifies compliance with select provisions of the 
MOU. This self-attestation is shared with the IRS 
as evidence of compliance.”153 Further, the FFA 
“contracts with an independent auditor to 
conduct a comprehensive audit of member sites to 
ensure member websites are in compliance with 
the provisions of the MOU.”154 The result of the 
audit is shared with the IRS, which in turn works 
with the FFA’s independent auditor to “adjudicate 
findings” and “address deficiencies” in 
compliance.155
Self-policing and self-reporting violations of 
the MOU, along with market incentives to rat out 
noncompliant competitor firms and oversight by 
an “independent” auditor, sound great in theory. 
But they haven’t worked. In fact, they’ve failed 
miserably. As we saw earlier, FFA companies 
made it virtually impossible during the 2019 filing 
season for eligible Free File taxpayers to find and 
use the Free File program by affirmatively hiding 
their Free File sites from internet searches, 
expending no resources to advertise or promote 
the existence of the IRS Free File website, and then 
paying millions of dollars to advertise their 
commercial sites by making them appear at the 
top of internet searches. So positioned, taxpayers 
were considerably more likely — indeed, 5.66 
times more likely156 — to visit these commercial 
sites where the taxpayer protections contained in 
the Free File MOU did not apply, where FFA 
companies expended considerable resources to 
make the sites appear as if they guaranteed free 
149
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150
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151
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return preparation and filing, and where FFA 
companies could seduce eligible Free File 
taxpayers into purchasing free tax filing products 
through dark patterns and trickery.
For its part, the FFA’s handpicked 
“independent” auditor did nothing to stop this 
misconduct and in fact may have facilitated it. In 
recent years, IRSAC has urged the IRS to unmask 
the FFA’s auditor, and to share that auditor’s 
review and findings with Congress and the 
public.157 IRSAC has also recommended that the 
IRS replace the FFA’s handpicked auditor with a 
truly independent third-party auditor, and to 
“expand the annual audit requirements of FFA 
members with a process that is objective and 
transparent, including a third-party audit of each 
member.”158 The IRS has refused to take action on 
these recommendations despite IRSAC’s 
insistence that implementation would “enhance 
the accountability of the program.”159
In terms of the secret auditor facilitating FFA 
companies’ noncompliance with the MOU, Mitre 
reported that the auditor annually conducts a 
“comprehensive audit of member sites, 
particularly in the area of web security, website 
links, search results, and source code.”160 That 
means the mystery auditor knew or should have 
known that FFA companies were actively hiding 
their Free File sites and buying paid search 
advertisements. It also means that the secret 
auditor knew or should have known that these 
tactics drove millions of eligible Free File users 
away from the Free File program and its related 
MOU protections to FFA companies’ unregulated 
commercial sites and the companies’ insatiable 
appetite for upselling paid products to low-
income taxpayers. Did the FFA auditor in fact 
identify this behavior during the 2019 filing 
season?161 If so, did it inform the IRS? In the event 
the IRS knew of this behavior, what did the tax 
agency do about it? And, in any event, why did it 
take the reporting of ProPublica to detect, 
investigate, and publicize the willful — and 
potentially illegal162 — actions of FFA companies 
to drive down participation in the Free File 
program and expose low-income taxpayers to 
FFA companies’ dirty tricks?
In reaching its insufficiently substantiated 
conclusion that FFA companies were “overall 
compliant to the terms of the MOU,”163 Mitre also 
relied on IRS oversight procedures of the Free File 
program.164 Critics of the Free File program and of 
FFA companies’ aggressive behavior toward 
eligible Free File taxpayers have slammed these 
procedures as being grossly deficient and 
harmful.
The national taxpayer advocate has identified 
Free File as the No. 4 “most serious problem” 
facing tax administration, in large part because of 
the IRS’s woeful oversight.165 The IRS “is devoting 
zero resources to oversight and testing of this 
program,”166 according to the national taxpayer 
advocate, and its failure “to set new goals for the 
Free File program or allocate sufficient money 
towards it reveals how the IRS prioritizes the Free 
File program and hinders the program from 
improving the e-filing services the IRS endorsed 
for taxpayers.”167 Indeed, substandard oversight 
harms the Free File program’s target population of 
low- and middle-income taxpayers. According to 
IRSAC, the IRS’s “deficient oversight and 
performance standards put vulnerable taxpayers 
at risk, and make it difficult to ensure that FFA 
members are upholding their obligation to 
provide tax preparation and e-filing services ‘to 
economically disadvantaged and underserved’” 
157
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taxpayers.168 In fact, IRSAC felt so strongly about 
increasing oversight over FFA companies that its 
2018 annual report exhorted the IRS to “assume a 
more direct role in ensuring that the Free File 
program provides taxpayers a way to file their 
taxes in a free and secure manner. The IRS should 
also have an expanded role in ensuring the 
program does not unnecessarily expose Free File 
users to upselling of paid products by FFA 
members.”169
To the extent the IRS exercises any kind of 
oversight over the Free File program and its 
private sector partners, the oversight is largely 
ministerial. For instance, the IRS conducts a 
clerical and perfunctory review of the program 
before the filing season and another during the 
filing season. The pre-season review merely 
entails verifying that FFA companies are capable 
of offering basic filing services, that they follow 
industry best practices respecting security and 
taxpayer privacy, and that their Free File offer 
covers not less than 10 percent and not more than 
50 percent of the individual taxpayer population. 
Or, in the words of the national taxpayer 
advocate, the review “is mainly to ensure the 
software providers’ technical compliance with the 
Free File MOU, and does not evaluate the quality 
of the offerings from Free File software 
providers.”170 The in-season review covers largely 
the same ground and includes ensuring that each 
FFA company is achieving a 75 percent 
acceptance rate for Free File returns.171
These perfunctory oversight responsibilities 
are carried out by just three full-time IRS 
employees. One of the employees devotes 100 
percent time to the traditional Free File program, 
while the other two devote the “majority” of their 
time to the Fillable Forms component of Free 
File.172 That’s right, the IRS thinks so little of the 
traditional Free File program that it assigns less 
than two full-time employees to provide 
oversight of the program, while abdicating all 
meaningful supervision to its for-profit private 
sector partners. And yet Mitre concluded that the 
“IRS’s current program resource allocation—for 
relationship management, planned periodic 
reviews, and direct, transparent collaboration 
with FFA members—is appropriate for the 
current level of work required by the Free File 
program.”173 Mitre reached this conclusion after 
previously concluding that FFA companies 
comply with the MOU,174 a conclusion that this 
report refutes.
The rosy picture that Mitre painted of the 
integrity of the Free File program, of FFA 
companies’ compliance with the MOU, and of IRS 
oversight of the program and its private sector 
partners is unsubstantiated and ultimately 
unwarranted. Moreover, Mitre’s defense of FFA 
companies concealing their Free File sites from 
eligible Free File users and further obscuring 
those sites by paying millions of dollars to lure 
eligible Free File taxpayers to paid commercial 
sites belied the independence of its report. Indeed, 
while the behavior of FFA companies might in 
fact rise to the level of violating consumer 
protection laws, Mitre only saw “free market 
tactics” that it described as “common, legal 
business practices used in the private sector to 
generate business” and “remain competitive and 
increase revenue.”175 But that’s a legal conclusion 
that Mitre was not in a position to adjudicate.
Certain “free market tactics” may be common, 
but whether they are legal or illegal is a job for 
168
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agencies to investigate and courts to adjudicate. 
Taken too far, the “free market tactics” employed 
by FFA companies may have run afoul of the law.
In fact, there is evidence that some FFA 
companies possessed actual knowledge that they 
were victimizing taxpayer-consumers with their 
“free commercial” software offerings. For one 
example, ProPublica reported that “Intuit knows 
it’s deceiving its customers” through ads for 
“free” TurboTax. An internal Intuit analysis of 
customer calls in 2019 found that “customers are 
getting upset,” because Intuit’s “free commercial” 
site advertises “Free, Free, Free, and the 
customers are assuming their return will be 
free.”176 Moreover, customer service agents “are 
suggesting an upgrade for customers when they 
don’t need it.”177 When customers click the 
upgrade they “are moving to Live without 
knowing it,” and then “getting upset when they 
have to pay more for the upgrade and the only 
way to downgrade is to clear and start over.”178 As 
another example involving Intuit, ProPublica 
reported that according to a former Intuit 
employee, “Steering customers away from 
TurboTax’s truly free option is a ‘purposeful 
strategy.’”179 When taxpayers go to Intuit’s “free 
commercial” site, the employee continued, the 
Intuit “landing page would direct you through a 
product flow that the company wanted to ensure 
would not make you aware of Free File.”180 In fact, 
Intuit’s “entire strategy” is designed to “make 
sure people read the word ‘free’ and click our site 
and never use a free product.”181 The strategy 
worked, according to the former employee, 
because the “vast majority of people who click 
[‘free’] will not pay $0.”182
The reality of Intuit’s “monetization strategy 
of the TurboTax Free Edition product”183 conflicts 
with its “free, free, free” marketing campaign 
where the only word spoken by actors in a series 
of ads is “free” in various contexts, including: a 
game show, a spelling bee, a lawyer’s courtroom 
statement to the jury, a high school placekicker 
reminiscing about learning how to kick field goals 
as a child, the closing credits of an action movie, 
and an elderly couple struggling with answers to 
a crossword puzzle.
Notwithstanding Mitre exonerating FFA 
companies’ “common, legal business practices,”184 
those practices are at the center of numerous 
agency investigations and consumer lawsuits 
against FFA companies. The investigative and 
legal activity focuses on whether FFA companies 
engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices 
and/or unfair methods of competition, as well as 
whether the companies conspired to further their 
allegedly illegal acts.
The breadth of this activity bears witness to 
the seriousness of the accusations and the 
strength of the available evidence. In May 2019 
TIGTA initiated a top-to-bottom audit of the Free 
File program that was prompted by concerns that 
“taxpayers eligible for the program were being 
charged for returns or being diverted to 
preparation services that are not free.”185 Release 
of the TIGTA audit is imminent. The FTC may be 
conducting its own investigation into the conduct 
of FFA companies at the behest of prominent 
members of Congress who were concerned that 
FFA companies’ affirmative acts to hide their Free 
File sites from internet searches violated federal 
law pertaining to unfair and deceptive trade 
practices and unfair competition and constituted 
a conspiracy.186 Also, at least five state attorneys 
general are investigating Intuit and other FFA 
companies for similar concerns, albeit with 
respect to violations of state rather than federal 
176
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law.187 Moreover, one of the country’s most 
formidable state regulators, the New York 
Department of Financial Services (DFS), is 
conducting its own investigation of Intuit, H&R 
Block, and other FFA companies over possible 
violations of the state’s unfair and deceptive trade 
practices law by steering taxpayers away from 
their Free File products and toward their paid 
products.188
The legal proceedings against FFA companies 
present equally serious challenges to the 
companies’ business practices. The Los Angeles 
city attorney filed separate suits against Intuit and 
H&R Block alleging the companies violated 
California’s unfair competition law.189 As alleged, 
Intuit and H&R Block “defrauded the lowest 
earning 70 percent of American taxpayers . . . by 
actively undermining public access to the IRS’s 
‘Free File’ program, while simultaneously 
employing deceptive and misleading advertising 
and design schemes intended to induce taxpayers 
into unnecessarily purchasing expensive 
products.”190 Santa Clara County sued Intuit 
under California’s false and deceptive advertising 
law alleging that Intuit made “false or misleading 
statements about TurboTax and taxpayers’ ability 
to file their taxes for free, by causing such 
statements to be made and disseminated to the 
public, and by making statements that taxpayers 
could use TurboTax for free with the intent to 
charge most of those taxpayers to use TurboTax 
and/or to sell a different service than 
advertised.”191 More than a dozen lawsuits 
brought by individual California residents (some 
purporting to represent a class of similarly 
situated Californians) were also filed against 
Intuit alleging violations of California’s unfair 
competition law,192 Consumers Legal Remedies 
Act,193 false advertising law,194 and general claims 
of fraud and unjust enrichment. Some of these 
suits have been consolidated into a large putative 
class action, which is proceeding in federal court 
in the Northern District of California.195 Others 
have been dismissed, stayed, or are pending.196
Thus, Mitre clearly spoke out of turn when it 
concluded that the actions of FFA companies that 
are the subject of these investigations and court 
proceedings were merely “common, legal 
business practices.”197
Proving the Lie in FFA’s ‘Philanthropy’
For years, the FFA and its member companies 
have been telling Congress, taxpayers, courts, and 
anyone who would listen that their participation 
in Free File is a “philanthropic endeavor.”198 In the 
words of Free File Executive Director Tim Hugo, 
FFA companies are “donating their services”199 to 
reflect the program’s “original philanthropic 
mission and intent.”200 Individual FFA companies 
mime Hugo’s narrative of philanthropy. As 
recently as December, Intuit’s Goodarzi 
characterized his company’s involvement in the 
FFA as, “We do this for good; this is a 
philanthropic effort.”201 Intuit has also been trying 
to convince courts of its philanthropy in the legal 
proceedings described earlier. According to 
company filings, Intuit and other return prep 
services firms “agreed with the IRS to donate” 
free versions of their commercial products to low-
income taxpayers,202 and that Intuit’s Free File 
187
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product was “created as part of Intuit’s public 
service initiative known as the Financial Freedom 
Foundation.”203
The FFA’s claim of acting philanthropically 
has always been a false narrative. But revelations 
over the last year that chronicled the lengths to 
which FFA companies have gone to (1) undermine 
the Free File program, (2) keep eligible Free File 
taxpayers from finding Free File sites where the 
MOU protected them from FFA companies’ 
upselling tactics, (3) lure eligible Free File 
taxpayers to “free commercial” sites, and (4) then 
trick them into paying for commercial products 
converts the already dubious claim to 
inconceivable. The FFA’s story of philanthropy 
mocks reality. Far from “donating their services” 
for free, FFA companies worked to “monetize 
free,”204 profiting off eligible Free File taxpayers at 
every turn.
Mitre’s report reinforced the hypocrisy of the 
FFA’s false narrative. According to Mitre, FFA 
companies participate in Free File purely for 
economic gain.205 “As private sector firms in a 
monopolistically competitive market,” FFA 
companies “operate in the interest of maximizing 
returns to their private investments.”206 To that 
end, FFA companies’ “participation in Free File is 
driven by the economic incentives such as 
preservation of market share, business 
development, greater revenues and profit, or a 
combination of the above.”207 Free File’s public-
private partnership “creates a value to the for-
profit industry that provides the service.”208 
“Without that value,” Mitre observed, “private 
companies may decline to participate.”209
At the end of the day, “The primary benefit of 
offering free services through Free File is that FFI 
members can earn additional business through 
the provision of free services.”210 No source of 
revenue is off limits for these profit-maximizing 
private sector companies, including revenue 
generated from eligible Free File users. By 
participating in the Free File program, Mitre 
explained that FFA companies “benefit from the 
potential business generated for their commercial 
products from taxpayers who are ineligible for 
Free File as well as taxpayers who are eligible for 
Free File but choose to use the commercial 
versions.”211 This business model is part of FFA 
companies’ “‘free-to-commercial’ customer 
conversion strategy.”212
Implementing this strategy requires FFA 
companies to be in a position to push their 
commercial products on eligible Free File users. 
Historically, that wasn’t a problem. The early 
MOUs contained few restrictions on the kind of 
ancillary and “value-added” products and 
services that FFA companies could cross-market 
and advertise on their Free File sites. These paid 
products and services included RALs, “value-
add” buttons that linked to paid commercial 
products, state returns with hidden fees, and 
emails sent to prior-year Free Filers welcoming 
them back with a link to FFA companies’ 
commercial sites rather than to Free File sites. 
Over the years, however, the MOU has been 
altered to include more taxpayer protections to 
restrict FFA companies from marketing paid 
services directly to Free File users.213
So FFA companies adapted. If it was harder to 
implement their “‘free-to-commercial’ customer 
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conversion strategy” with taxpayers starting out 
on Free File sites, FFA companies would simply 
hide those sites while making it easier to find and 
enter commercial sites. That is precisely what they 
did in anticipation of the 2019 filing season. As 
described earlier, FFA companies took affirmative 
acts to make it virtually impossible for eligible 
Free File taxpayers to find their Free File sites 
through internet searches while those companies 
were spending more than $17 million to make it 
considerably easier for eligible Free File taxpayers 
to find their “free commercial” sites through web 
searches, and then making those sites appear to be 
offering free returns for low-income taxpayers 
with promises of “FREE guaranteed. $0 Fed. $0 
State. $0 To File.”214
Once on these commercial websites, eligible 
Free File taxpayers felt the full force of FFA 
companies’ “‘free-to-commercial’ customer 
conversion strategy” as well as what Mitre 
described as the related “freemium” business 
model.215 The idea of freemium is to offer 
customers both free and paid versions of a 
product or service, in this case return preparation 
and filing services. By design, the free versions 
include less functionality, which allows the 
company to convert free users to paid users of the 
companies’ premium versions of the same 
product through the allure of upgraded features. 
In the standard freemium business model, “the 
free version is available to everyone,”216 
sophisticated and unsophisticated consumers 
alike, such that all customers are subject to the 
aggressive “‘free-to-commercial’ customer 
conversion strategy.” But in the context of eligible 
Free File users, the free version is offered only to 
“economically disadvantaged and underserved” 
taxpayers,217 the most vulnerable and least 
sophisticated taxpayer cohort. To the extent FFA 
companies are successful in converting these 
taxpayers to their paid products, the companies 
“can use other marketing strategies to retain 
paying customers and potentially increase prices 
over time.”218
By leveraging the combined power of the 
“‘free-to-commercial’ customer conversion 
strategy” and the freemium business model, FFA 
companies treat eligible Free File taxpayers no 
differently than other taxpayers. But eligible Free 
File taxpayers are vastly different from other 
taxpayers. For starters, they have an expectancy 
interest in receiving a free tax return. Both the 
government and FFA companies have promised 
them free tax return filing through Free File, while 
FFA companies have also promised them a free 
return on their free commercial sites. Given these 
assurances, eligible Free File taxpayers reasonably 
expect to file their returns for free. Nor are they in 
the market for commercial tax return preparation 
and filing services. These eligible Free File 
taxpayers are further dissimilar to other taxpayers 
because they are prequalified for a free return as 
economically disadvantaged and underserved 
persons as defined by the Free File MOU. They are 
composed of some combination of low-income, 
financially unsophisticated, nonnative English-
speaking populations trying to find a free, safe 
opportunity to fulfill their return filing 
obligations.
The Free File program is supposed to provide 
that safe haven. But FFA companies have co-opted 
it for their own economic gain by extracting 
revenue from eligible Free File taxpayers. In the 
process, FFA companies have harmed (and 
continue to harm) tens of millions of economically 
disadvantaged and underserved persons they 
have pledged to help file returns “at no cost.”219 So 
much for FFA companies’ participation in Free 
File reflecting a “philanthropic endeavor.”220
Warning the IRS Not to Challenge FFA Tactics
In both its final report and appendix on the 
economics of the Free File program, Mitre spent 
considerable time discussing the nature of the 
public-private partnership entered into by the 
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IRS, the FFA, and individual FFA companies. In 
these discussions, Mitre emphasized that for the 
partnership to be successful, it required balancing 
the interests and goals of the IRS, the FFA’s 
member companies, and the taxpayers that the 
partners have pledged to assist in preparing and 
filing tax returns for free.221 According to Mitre, 
taxpayers were interested in a “lower economic 
cost of tax preparation and tax filing,” while the 
government realized “lower administrative and 
oversight cost” and FFA companies derived 
“increased business development and revenue 
generation opportunities.”222 Moreover, Mitre 
assigned the job of performing the balancing act 
to the government. The IRS is “in a unique 
position of having to balance taxpayer 
expectations from the program,” Mitre opined, 
“with the industry members’ outlook for 
economic gains.”223
Not all interests were created equal in Mitre’s 
typology. The interests of FFA companies clearly 
predominated. The Free File public-private 
partnership calls for “a balance that serves the 
interests of the government and taxpayers,” 
allowed Mitre, “but also creates a value to the for-
profit industry that provides the service. Without 
that value,” Mitre warned the IRS, “private 
companies may decline to participate.”224
That FFA companies participate in Free File 
purely for economic gain is not newsworthy. It is 
well documented that FFA companies view Free 
File as a bundled “free-to-fee” marketing package 
with advertised free federal returns serving as the 
loss leader providing opportunities to sell “value 
added” services.225 The Mitre report confirmed 
and then broadened our understanding that FFA 
companies’ “participation in Free File is driven by 
economic incentives,”226 and that FFA companies 
impose an aggressive free-to-commercial 
customer conversion strategy and freemium 
business model on eligible Free File taxpayers.227
More remarkable is the extent to which Mitre 
cautioned the IRS that exercising additional 
oversight of the Free File program might erode 
the revenue FFA companies extract from low-
income taxpayers attempting to participate in the 
program. “It is beneficial” for FFA companies “to 
continue participating in the program as long as 
they can recover program costs through 
additional revenue generated via new business 
development opportunities. Additional FFI 
revenues are profit.”228 The current MOU,229 Mitre 
offered, “leaves sufficient room for FFI 
[companies] to pursue marketing their 
commercial services to all taxpayers, including 
ones who are eligible for Free File, as long as the 
marketing is done outside of FFI landing 
pages.”230 In other words, the current MOU 
221
See, e.g., final report, supra note 42, at 1 (stating Free File “is a 
partnership between IRS and industry that depends upon balance and 
cooperation to achieve success”); id. at 9 (the IRS must “balance taxpayer 
expectations from the program with the industry members’ outlook for 
economic gains while ensuring that the agency remains cost-effective in 
implementing Free File”); id. at xviii (stating the “partnership requires a 
balance that serves the interest of the government and taxpayers, but 
also creates a value to the for-profit industry that provides the service”); 
and id. at 82 (same). For the pledge that the IRS and FFA make to eligible 
Free File users, see Eighth MOU, supra note 2, at art. 2 (“Members shall 
work in concert with the IRS to increase electronic filing of tax returns, 
which includes extending the benefits of online federal tax preparation 
and electronic filing to economically disadvantaged and underserved 
populations at no cost to either the individual user or to the public 
treasury.”).
222
Final report, supra note 42, at 58.
223
Appendix A, supra note 62, at 6. See also id. at 37 (exactly the same); 
id. at 40 (exactly the same); and id. at 43 (exactly the same).
224
Final report, supra note 42, at 58.
225
See, e.g., Elliott and Kiel, supra note 176; Elliott, supra note 8; Elliott 
and Waldron, supra note 5; Dylan Matthews, “Why I’m Boycotting 
TurboTax This Year,” Vox, Apr. 14, 2019; Root, supra note 198; Matthews, 
“Elizabeth Warren Has a Great Idea for Making Tax Day Less Painful,” 
Vox, Apr. 14, 2018; Jessica Huseman, “Filing Taxes Could Be Free and 
Simple. But H&R Block and Intuit Are Still Lobbying Against It,” 
ProPublica, Mar. 20, 2017; Chris Morran, “Why Isn’t It Easier to File Your 
Tax Return for Free? Thank TurboTax, H&R Block,” Consumerist, Mar. 20, 
2017; Samantha Sharf, “You Call That Free? What TurboTax and the Free 
File Alliance Cost One Millennial,” Forbes, Feb. 8, 2016; Liz Day, 
“TurboTax Maker Linked to ‘Grassroots’ Campaign Against Free, Simple 
Tax Filing,” ProPublica, Apr. 14, 2014; and Laura Sanders, “Why ‘Free 
File’ for Taxes Isn’t So Popular: Here’s How to Navigate the Maze of 
Offerings and Avoid Charges,” The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 30, 2014.
226
Supra note 207. See also supra notes 204-221 and accompanying text.
227
See supra notes 210-219 and accompanying text.
228
Appendix A, supra note 62, at 38.
229
See Eighth MOU, supra note 2, and Addendum to the Eighth 
Memorandum of Understanding on Service Standards and Disputes 
Between the Internal Revenue Service and Free File Inc. (Dec. 26, 2019) 
(addendum to MOU).
230
Appendix A, supra note 62, at 41.
SPECIAL REPORT
TAX NOTES FEDERAL, FEBRUARY 10, 2020  851
acknowledges the legitimacy of FFA companies’ 
free-to-commercial customer conversion strategy 
and freemium business model. But the 
willingness of FFA companies to continue 
participating in the MOU “depend[s] on the 
extent to which the IRS imposes restrictions on the 
business activities of tax software companies.”231 
And just in case the IRS failed to understand 
Mitre’s message, it enunciated that additional IRS 
oversight of FFA business practices “that impedes 
on business development and profit-making 
activities of tax software companies would drive 
out firms from participating in Free File.”232
Mitre also warned the IRS against responding 
impulsively to the simmering outcry over FFA 
companies’ business activities and their adverse 
effects on Free File participation and eligible Free 
File users. The IRS should resist the temptation to 
“alleviate taxpayer and public concerns” over 
FFA companies’ perceived misconduct with 
changes to the MOU that “restrict or dictate FFA’s 
business practices.”233 Such added oversight “is 
not likely to have a significant influence on the 
free market actions” of FFA companies,234 and 
might induce some companies to walk away from 
Free File with others demanding concessions to 
stay.235 The IRS should further resist adopting the 
position of some critics that “one Free File eligible 
customer paying for tax preparation services is 
one too many.”236 Far better to adopt a balanced 
approach to concerns over how the business 
practices of FFA companies suppressed Free File 
participation, damaged the program, or harmed 
taxpayers. “In the interest of reducing taxpayer 
burden and ensuring a greater number of eligible 
taxpayers actively use Free File,” Mitre suggested, 
“the IRS can seek to make more effective use of the 
MOU to prevent FFI’s actions that put downward 
pressure on Free File usage.”237 But at the same 
time, “to ensure participation of Free File service 
providers, the IRS needs to leave room for 
Alliance Members to benefit from the program.”238
Mitre seemed to be telling the IRS that its only 
option is to grin and bear its private sector Free 
File partners, and that it should not counteract 
affirmative acts to suppress Free File usage by 
making it virtually impossible for taxpayers to 
find Free File websites. The same goes for 
circumventing the taxpayer protections contained 
in the MOU, purchasing paid advertisements to 
multiply traffic to “free commercial” sites, and 
overwhelming eligible Free File taxpayers with 
free-to-commercial customer conversion 
strategies and freemium business models. If the 
IRS restricted any of this activity, Mitre warned, it 
would be met by FFA companies’ equal or greater 
counterpunch, including exacting other economic 
concessions from the program or walking away 
from the program altogether.
Mitre repeated this warning in the context of 
the underlying bargain the Free File program 
struck in 2002. That agreement pledged FFA 
companies to provide free tax return preparation 
and filing services “to economically 
disadvantaged and underserved populations at 
no cost to either the individual user or to the 
public treasury.” In exchange, the IRS pledged “to 
not enter the tax preparation software and e-filing 
services marketplace.”239 At the time, a 
government-run e-filing program posed an 
existential threat to private sector return 
preparation service firms, and the IRS’s promise 
not to compete with private industry represented 
a valuable concession.240 But according to Mitre, 
the threat of a government-run e-filing program 
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has lessened considerably over the years with the 
value of the MOU’s noncompete clause similarly 
eroding in value. “While theoretically possible,” 
Mitre said, the “IRS’s entry into the tax 
preparation industry is a non-credible threat to 
private companies.”241 Cost, implementation, 
administration, and maintenance of a 
government-run e-filing program make it a 
prohibitively “risky and costly endeavor” for the 
IRS.242 Meanwhile, FFA companies bear the “bulk 
of the cost of program development and 
implementation.”243 Thus, Mitre recommended 
that where the “IRS’s entry into the [e-filing] 
market is not a credible threat,” and where FFA 
companies bear a disproportionate burden of 
running the program, the original bargain struck 
between the IRS and its private sector partners 
“should be reevaluated.”244 During that 
reevaluation, moreover, the IRS should be 
mindful that “existing FFI members have little 
incentive to offer free tax services unless these 
offerings lead to additional business 
opportunities.”245
Without getting into the merits and demerits 
of a government-run e-filing program,246 it is 
enough to say that any threat of FFA companies 
walking away from the Free File program due to 
increased IRS oversight through changes to the 
MOU is hollow. Over the last year, we learned the 
extent to which FFA companies circumvent the 
MOU by hiding their Free File sites (where the 
MOU applies) while paying millions of dollars to 
direct eligible Free File users to their “free 
commercial” sites (where the MOU doesn’t 
apply). Short of prohibiting FFA companies from 
engaging in these tactics or mandating that the 
companies “down-sell” free products to 
taxpayers otherwise eligible to use Free File, the 
IRS could add almost as many restrictions to the 
MOU as it wanted and FFA companies would still 
participate.
Moreover, any talk of FFA companies 
demanding concessions from the IRS because the 
noncompete clause has lost all value is phooey. 
Indeed, Goodarzi told employees at a recent 
companywide meeting that he requested the IRS 
to remove the noncompete clause from the MOU. 
“There is something in the memorandum of 
understanding with the IRS Free File that says the 
IRS can’t compete with us. We told them, remove 
that. We do this for good; this is a philanthropic 
effort.”247 Goodarzi knows that the strategy to 
extract revenue from the Free File program these 
days takes place outside the MOU, almost 
completely beyond the control of the IRS. He also 
knows the value of remaining a member of the 
FFA, and of being able to claim that his company’s 
participation in Free File “is a philanthropic 
effort.”248
Deficient User Testing
As part of its report, Mitre conducted 
“taxpayer experience testing” on real taxpayers to 
determine the usability of the Free File program. 
It sent out invitation letters to 2,500 randomly 
selected taxpayers from six ZIP codes in Chicago, 
all of whom used the Free File program to file 
2018 federal income tax returns.249 The 2,500 
invitations yielded 141 responses from potential 
participants. Ultimately, Mitre whittled the 
participant pool to 29 taxpayers, all of whom 
participated in usability testing sessions that 
included debriefing questions and interviews 
with Mitre researchers.250
The usability tasks that these taxpayers 
performed included: (1) locating the Free File 
program with a web browser; (2) navigating the 
Free File landing page and selecting a Free File 
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offer from one of three FFA companies randomly 
selected by Mitre; and (3) completing a tax return 
with the selected FFA company’s Free File 
software.251 For purposes of the taxpayer 
experience testing, participants did not input their 
own taxpayer characteristics but rather those 
contained in the profiles of one of three fictitious 
taxpayer scenarios provided by Mitre.252 
Taxpayers used these scenarios to choose specific 
FFA companies’ Free File offers, create an account 
with the selected FFA company, and prepare a tax 
return right up until pressing “submit” to file the 
return. The taxpayer scenarios included:
Eligible taxpayer “simple” scenario. A 
single taxpayer with no dependents, who 
has only income reported on a Form W-2. 
The taxpayer is eligible for Free File.
Eligible taxpayer “complex” scenario. A 
married filing jointly taxpayer, with a 
spouse and two dependent children. The 
taxpayer reports income from two jobs 
(two Form W-2s) and interest income on 
Form 1099-INT. The taxpayer is eligible for 
Free File.
Ineligible scenario. A single taxpayer who 
reports income from a Form W-2. The 
taxpayer is ineligible for Free File due to 
having wage income of $74,000.253
Finally, the usability testing and interviews 
were designed to accomplish certain objectives. 
These objectives included: (1) understanding how 
taxpayers find the Free File program online and 
how they select a company’s Free File product; (2) 
discerning any usability issues with IRS Free File 
websites or the Free File sites of the three 
randomly selected FFA companies; and (3) 
learning taxpayers’ previous experiences with the 
Free File program.254
The above research design of Mitre’s “user 
testing” exhibited several deficiencies.
First, the sample size of 29 taxpayers was 
disturbingly small, representing just 0.001238 
percent of the 2,343,235 returns filed through the 
Free File program in 2019255 and 0.000018661 
percent of the 155,402,000 individual income tax 
returns in 2019.256 Such a diminutive sample size is 
not representative of the Free File population that 
Mitre’s taxpayer experience testing was 
purporting to study. Mitre explained the small 
sample size was due to “limitations of time,” the 
same reason it gave for including only three out of 
12 FFA companies in its user experience testing.257
Second, the sample population of taxpayers 
that Mitre selected to participate in its user 
experience testing had already successfully filed 
their returns during the 2019 filing season using 
Free File. Thus, they already knew how to search 
for Free File, how to select from multiple FFA 
companies’ Free File offers, and how to complete 
and submit a Free File return. In other words, 
these taxpayers knew what was on the test and 
how they could earn an “A,” because they had 
already navigated the three usability objectives 
that Mitre set out to test.258 And yet, these 
taxpayers still exhibited difficulty finding FFA 
Free File offers, selecting FFA offers, and 
navigating the workflow of FFA software.259
Third, the fictitious taxpayer scenarios that 
Mitre designed were softball scenarios. They 
reflected plain vanilla taxpayer characteristics 
and obvious eligibility/ineligibility criteria that 
should have posed no problems for, respectively, 
taxpayers selecting an FFA company’s Free File 
offer and FFA companies discerning eligibility/
ineligibility of the testing participants.260 
Nonetheless, participants in Mitre’s taxpayer 
experience testing still reported significant 
dissatisfaction with the IRS Free File landing page 
and FFA companies’ Free File sites and software.261 
Mitre’s fictitious taxpayer scenarios also ignored 
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common taxpayer characteristics that could 
render a taxpayer ineligible for Free File but 
would become apparent only after selecting a 
company’s Free File offer and starting to fill out a 
return. These characteristics include, for example, 
certain education expenses that qualify for tax 
benefits; the receipt of small business income; 
incurring related small business expenses; and the 
receipt of unemployment, disability, or elderly 
benefits.
Nor did Mitre’s fictitious taxpayer scenarios 
test for some important changes made to the 
MOU in 2018. For one example, FFA companies 
must alert taxpayers “at the earliest feasible 
point” when they become ineligible for that 
company’s Free File offer and why they were 
deemed ineligible.262 The same part of the MOU 
requires FFA companies to direct ineligible 
taxpayers back to the IRS Free File landing page as 
“the first and most prominent alternative action” 
so that ineligible taxpayers can consider Free File 
offers from other FFA companies.263 Thereafter, an 
FFA company may offer taxpayers to remain on 
its Free File site to complete and file a return for 
free, as long as the taxpayer is under the lowest 70 
percent of taxpayers by AGI, or $66,000 for tax 
year 2018.264 The final alternative allows FFA 
companies to offer an ineligible taxpayer the 
option of continuing on their Free File site and 
paying a fee (fully disclosed) to file a return.
It does not appear that Mitre attempted to 
determine if the three randomly selected FFA 
companies followed these procedures during the 
taxpayer experience testing. Mitre could have 
easily tested for compliance or noncompliance 
with these procedures for its third taxpayer 
scenario: a clearly ineligible Free File user due to 
disqualifying income of $74,000.265 Further, Mitre 
was acutely aware of this form of noncompliance, 
because its data analysis of returns filed during 
the 2019 filing season and marked “Free File” by 
FFA companies revealed several hundred returns 
where the Free File indicator incorrectly included 
returns with AGI exceeding $66,000.266
Finally, to the extent Mitre’s taxpayer 
experience testing produced meaningful results, 
it found that the Free File program confounded 
taxpayers on multiple levels, notwithstanding 
that these taxpayers had successfully submitted 
Free File returns only a few months earlier. A 
good portion of the confusion can be attributed to 
FFA companies hiding their Free File sites from 
eligible Free File users and then spending millions 
of dollars to funnel those taxpayers to the 
company’s commercial sites decorated with 
promises of “free guaranteed” returns.267 Mitre 
neglected to make that connection or explore its 
implications for eligible Free File taxpayers.
Mitre found its test subjects “conflated the 
Free File program with other forms of filing taxes 
for free, including commercial software,” a 
blurring of the lines that FFA companies have 
worked hard to achieve.268 Taxpayer-participants 
“mistook finding an e-file provider for finding a 
Free File software vendor,”269 and they “were 
unsure whether they had used Free File or a free 
commercial version in the past.”270 Moreover, 
participants generally “seemed unclear on the 
relationship between the IRS and Free File,” with 
some test subjects “express[ing] surprise that Free 
File vendors are commercial companies, not 
directly offered through the IRS.”271
Moreover, a high percentage of participants 
“ended their Free File search on a commercial 
vendor website” rather than on Free File landing 
pages.272 Indeed, Mitre reported that nine of its 29 
test participants “navigated to a commercial 
website as part of the process while they were 
searching for Free File,” with four of them 
“ultimately stay[ing] on the commercial page, not 
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realizing that they had not selected a Free File 
offer.”273 Taxpayer-participants expressed shared 
difficulty with “struggl[ing] to find the Free File 
landing page, including through IRS.gov,”274 a 
challenge whose origins can be traced to FFA 
companies’ substantial efforts to hide their Free 
File websites from internet searches and to 
superordinate their commercial sites through 
paid search advertisements.275
Much like the rest of Mitre’s “independent” 
review of the Free File program, its taxpayer 
usability testing failed to connect the dots 
between FFA companies’ behavior and eligible 
Free File users’ experience with the program. 
Indeed, the review amounted to a series of siloed 
observations with no meaningful analysis of the 
harm that FFA companies have done to the Free 
File program and to eligible Free File taxpayers.
IRS Complicity in FFA Tactics
Imagine a partnership with two partners. 
They open a soup kitchen in a depressed part of 
town to serve the community’s economically 
disadvantaged and underserved population. 
Partner A is a public interest lawyer specializing 
in poverty law, with experience operating meal 
centers. Partner B made a fortune in the payday 
loan business and is now dedicated to 
philanthropic endeavors. Under the partnership 
agreement, Partner A is responsible for day-to-
day operations of the kitchen, while Partner B 
funds the business and provides a building free of 
rent. The business serves thousands of meals a 
day to persons dependent on the kitchen for food. 
Over time, Partner A learns that Partner B never 
gave up its old ways and has been hawking high-
interest payday loans to patrons of the kitchen. 
The loans might violate state usury laws. Partner 
A confronts Partner B. They renegotiate the 
partnership agreement to prohibit the sale of 
financial products anywhere on the property 
housing the soup kitchen.
Shortly thereafter, Partner B moves the soup 
kitchen across town to another of Partner B’s 
buildings. In the old building, Partner B opens a 
business, “Partner B’s Free Pizza & Payday 
Loans,” where the pizza is “free” only for patrons 
who also take out loans. Patrons of the old kitchen 
try to find the new kitchen, but it is in a remote 
part of town inaccessible by public transportation. 
Meanwhile, they have to eat, and they often need 
money. So they eat pizza and incur debt they 
struggle to repay. Partner A keeps the relocated 
kitchen up and running with a monthly pittance 
from Partner B. The kitchen serves a fraction of the 
patrons it previously served. Partner A worries 
about Partner B illegally extending credit to 
vulnerable members of the community. 
Ultimately, Partner A turns a blind eye to Partner 
B’s questionable business tactics.
Now consider the Free File partnership.
Partner A and Partner B agree to offer free 
online tax return filing to tens of millions of 
disadvantaged and underserved taxpayers 
through the program. Partner A is a public tax 
agency, and Partner B is a consortium of private 
sector tax services firms. Under the partnership 
agreement,276 Partner A lends its name to the 
program and hosts its official website, while 
Partner B provides tax return filing software and 
hosts additional program sites. In the beginning, 
the agreement contained few restrictions on 
ancillary and value added products and services 
that Partner B could cross-market, advertise, and 
sell on its program sites. Over time, the agreement 
restricted Partner B’s ability to engage in these 
tactics. Recently, Partner A and Partner B 
renegotiated its agreement to make it harder for 
Partner B to generate revenue from taxpayers 
filing returns on program sites.
Shortly thereafter, Partner B took affirmative 
steps to remove program sites from internet 
searches. At the same time, Partner B spent 
millions of dollars to direct internet traffic to its 
“free commercial” sites where the terms and 
conditions of the program agreement did not 
apply, and where Partner B could aggressively 
impose its free-to-fee business model on 273
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taxpayers in search of free return filing. News 
organizations discovered and publicized Partner 
B’s tactics and their subversive effects on the 
program. The revelations induced investigations 
and lawsuits involving Partner B’s potential 
violation of consumer protection laws. 
Meanwhile, Partner A stood by Partner B and 
even defended Partner B’s actions. To quell public 
and political outcry, Partner A hired a company to 
review the program. Partner A has previously 
contracted billions of dollars in business with the 
company.
Both of the above partnerships started out 
with noble intentions. Both served economically 
disadvantaged and underserved populations. 
Both provided services at no cost that the target 
populations desperately needed: On one hand, 
food compelled by hunger, and on the other, tax 
return filing compelled by law. Both partnerships 
also promised to deliver those services for free. 
But one of the partners in each partnership 
(Partner B) saw an opportunity to exploit and then 
profit off the essentiality of the services and the 
target populations’ lack of sophistication. At the 
same time, the other partner in each partnership 
(Partner A) did little to stop its partner from 
harming the respective target populations.
To be sure, both Partners A could have done 
more to protect their customers. But Partner A in 
the second scenario, the IRS, is more culpable. For 
starters, the IRS defended277 its Free File partners 
in the face of evidence that FFA companies 
undermined the Free File program by hiding their 
Free File sites from internet searches and luring 
eligible Free File taxpayers to their “free 
commercial” sites where they could flout the 
MOU and its taxpayer protections. Moreover, the 
IRS continues to exercise no meaningful oversight 
of its FFA partners’ tactics,278 some of which are 
under investigation for running afoul of the law.279 
Nor does the IRS seem to care that its Free File 
partners knowingly victimize taxpayers through 
questionable tactics.280 The IRS also sends eligible 
Free File taxpayers to FFA companies’ customer 
service agents for help with their Free File 
software and sites,281 agents that the IRS knows or 
should know are on strict orders to steer callers 
away from free products to paid products.282 
Recently, evidence has also emerged that the IRS 
allows alterations to the MOU — ostensibly 
jointly negotiated between the IRS and FFA — to 
be written by the FFA.283
Further, the IRS allows FFA companies to 
trade on its good name to the distinct detriment of 
the agency. Indeed, yielding oversight of the Free 
File program (and perhaps the contents of the 
MOU) to the FFA and its member companies 
harms not just taxpayers but the IRS itself. As I 
have said elsewhere, when FFA companies 
engage in predatory behavior through Free File, it 
“reflect[s] negatively on the IRS,” because in the 
eyes of taxpayers, the IRS “is an accomplice to the 
misconduct of FFA companies.”284 Heck, it’s the 
“IRS Free File” program, after all. The national 
taxpayer advocate has made the same 
observation. Because Free File software can be 
accessed through IRS.gov, “taxpayers may be 
under the false impression that the IRS endorses 
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the Free File products available there, and thus a 
poor experience with Free File may reflect poorly 
on the IRS and can erode taxpayers’ trust in fair 
tax administration.”285
Now more than ever, the IRS has some 
explaining to do. We need to know what the IRS 
has to say about Mitre’s characterization of FFA 
companies’ participation in Free File as being 
“driven by economic incentives.”286 We also need 
to know if the IRS endorses FFA companies 
subjecting eligible Free File taxpayers to the 
companies’ free-to-commercial customer 
conversion strategy and freemium business 
model.287 We further need to learn whether the IRS 
is less concerned about “a target number of 
participants” using the Free File program, and 
more concerned about “maximizing awareness to 
ensure people recognize it as a choice.”288 If the 
answer is yes to this last query, we need to know 
what the IRS thinks about its private sector 
partners taking affirmative acts to decrease rather 
than increase awareness of the program, thereby 
making the “choice” of participating in Free File a 
false choice. Further, we need to know what the 
IRS thinks about the FFA’s assertion that 
taxpayers are not considered Free File taxpayers 
— and thus not protected by the MOU from FFA 
companies’ free-to-fee tactics — unless and until 
they come to the program through the IRS Free 
File landing page.
In late December 2019 the IRS answered some 
of these questions in an addendum to the Free File 
MOU.289 According to the IRS, the addendum 
amended the MOU to “help make the Free File 
program more taxpayer-friendly while 
strengthening consumer protections in several 
key areas.”290 Most notably, the amended MOU 
now prohibits FFA companies from “engaging in 
any practice that would cause the Member’s Free 
File Landing Page to be excluded from an organic 
internet search.”291 The IRS and FFA should be 
commended for adding this provision to the 
MOU; it is an undeniably beneficial change. So, 
too, are new provisions that require FFA 
companies to conduct customer satisfaction 
surveys throughout the filing season and to 
deliver quarterly summaries to the IRS that can be 
shared publicly;292 to standardize the name of 
companies’ Free File offers reflected on the IRS 
Free File website as well as on their own Free File 
landing pages;293 and to ensure that the Free File 
indicator appears only on tax returns that meet 
eligibility criteria of FFA companies’ Free File 
offers.294 The addendum also struck the 
noncompete clause in the MOU that from the 
program’s inception prohibited the IRS from 
“enter[ing] the tax return software and e-file 
services marketplace.”295
At the same time, the addendum leaves 
enforcement of these new provisions to the self-
reporting and self-attestation procedures that 
previously failed to rein in FFA companies’ 
harmful behavior.296 It also affirms the 
effectiveness of the FFA’s “independent 
auditor,”297 the same auditor that knew or should 
have known FFA companies were actively hiding 
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place.
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Id. at Section II. Practically speaking, this change to the MOU is not 
as valuable as it sounds given current and foreseeable budget constraints 
on the IRS, the agency’s historical lack of enthusiasm for offering its own 
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preparation service firms against such an effort.
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Free File sites and buying paid search 
advertisements during the 2019 filing season.298 
Who will enforce the new provision that FFA 
companies refrain from concealing their Free File 
sites? Or placing the Free File indicator on returns 
for taxpayers who do not meet Free File’s 
eligibility requirements or who end up paying for 
their “free” return? Or alerting ineligible 
taxpayers “at the earliest feasible point” that they 
are in fact ineligible for that company’s Free File 
product and that they can return to the IRS Free 
File landing page via a prominently displayed 
link?299 If the answer to these and similar questions 
is “FFA companies and the FFA’s independent 
auditor,” the recent amendments to the MOU 
designed to protect taxpayers are worthless.
In fact, there is already cause for concern that 
the amendments will harm rather than help 
taxpayers. The addendum to the MOU 
memorializes the right of FFA companies to 
unleash their the free-to-commercial customer 
conversion strategy and freemium business 
model on eligible Free File taxpayers who engage 
FFA companies on their “free commercial” sites 
rather than on their Free File sites. “Nothing in 
this Addendum, the MOU, or the IRS Agreement 
limits or changes the right of Members to engage 
in any business activity outside the IRS Free File 
Program . . . including without limitation all 
marketing, advertising or promotion of 
commercial tax preparation software or services 
offered at no cost or for a fee outside of the Free 
File Program offering to any taxpayers.”300 And 
while FFA companies can no longer actively hide 
their Free File sites from internet searches, they 
can still spend millions of dollars on paid search 
advertisements that make their “free commercial” 
sites overwhelm organic searches for the IRS Free 
File program. Moreover, they can still make their 
“free commercial” sites appear to be free with 
misleading promises of “Free Federal. Free State. 
Free to File. FREE guaranteed. $0 $0 $0.”301 In other 
words, they can still trick eligible Free File 
taxpayers into paying to file federal and state 
returns they should be getting for free.
By expressly endorsing FFA companies’ 
aggressive free-to-fee strategies, the IRS is 
complicit in the harm that FFA companies cause 
economically disadvantaged and underserved 
taxpayers. These are the taxpayers that the Free 
File program aims to help and that the Free File 
MOU aims to protect. The IRS needs new Free File 
partners to help these taxpayers. It needs partners 
dedicated to delivering truly free return filing 
services to eligible Free File users. Continuing to 
stand by its current partners will continue to 
implicate the IRS in those partners’ abusive and 
potentially illegal302 behavior. 
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